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ABSTRACT

The purposes of this study are two*
to differentiate
between the several meanings that various authors have
given to the term "Balance of Power," and to compare a
balance of power international system with a bipolar inter national system.
In making this comparison two paradigms are con structed, one of a balance of power system, another of a
bipolar system.
In the balance of power system three
types of policy are explored:
automatic, semi - automatic,
and manual.
In addition, a distinction is made between
the operator in a semi - automatic system and the balancer
found in all balance of power systems.
In the bipolar system two types of policy are explored:
automatic and manual.
Loose and tight bloc systems are also
examined, along with contagious competition between the
super powers.
The comparison of the two systems suggests that while
they have similarities in structure, the difference in the
number of essential actors in each system has a profound
effect upon the operation of the systems.
The bipolar
system has contagious competition, while a balance of power
system does not.
Alliance systems are more rigid and prone
toward the formation of blocs in the bipolar system.
Ideology and nationalism also play a greater role in the
operation of the bipolar system.
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THE BALANCE OP POWER AND BIPOLARITYs
A COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS

INTRODUCTION

In attempting to conduct a precise discussion of any
particular aspect of international politics,

it is essential

that one define precisely what he means when he uses any
particular term.

This is important because any scientific

observation can only be so when the findings of one indi vidual are transmissible to others.

In order for such

findings to be intertransmissible, they must be carefully
defined in order that others may understand them.

This is

a particularly important aspect of a discussion that is to
center around a term that is as vague as the balance of
power.
It is perhaps unfortunate that the use of the phrase
"balance of power" has been so ambiguous in the past, for
this makes it extremely difficult for one to conduct a
scientific inquiry into a very important feature of inter national politics.
discipline,

A vague use of any term, in any

can do little to contribute to a greater

understanding of problems associated with that term.
the physical sciences,

In

it was found necessary to establish

an absolute definition of freezing in order that variations
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in climate and air pressure would not be able to effect
the reports of certain experiments.
definition,

With such an absolute

it was found that natural scientists could

attain a greater degree of accuracy in their inquiry than
they had previously approached,

and that the intertrans -

missibility of their findings was greater,

due to the fact

that there was no longer any doubt as to the temperature
at which an observation took place.

The manner in which

the balance of power has been used has been plagued with
problems similar to those which plagued physical scientists
attempting to establish an exact temperature reading in the
absence of a precise definition of zero.

Theorists using

the term have done so without establishing an exact reference
point that would allow one to determine how the concept was
being used.

Imprecise use of the term has caused it to

take on the characteristics of a blanket that is placed
over many differing types of power relationships.

This has

created a situation in which one finds it difficult to
determine the exact nature of what is being described.
In using the phrase '"balance of power," one can be
seeking to describe several different things.
genthau used the term in several ways:

Hans Mor -

as a policy aimed
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at a certain state of affairs, as an approximately equal
state of affairs, as an actual state of affairs, or as any
distribution of power.*

Organski begins by describing the

balance of power as a system in which there are "a large
number of nations with varying amounts of power, each one
striving to maximize its own power,” but then goes on to
use the same term to describe two different distributions
of power, a "simple,” and a "multiple" balance, as he calls
them.^

Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff conceive of the balance

of power "as a situation or condition, as a universal
tendency or law of state behavior, as a guide for states manship,

and as a mode of system - maintenance characteristic

of certain types of international s y s t e m s . "3

Ernst B.

Haas found eight different uses for the terras

(1 ) any

distribution of power, whether distributed evenly among a
number of states, or centered in the hands of just a few,
(2 ) an equilibrium in which two sides have a nearly equal
amount of strength,

(3 ) hegemony, where one particulair

state, or group of states, dominates,

(4) stability and

peace in a concert of power, such as the nineteenth century
concert of Europe,

(5) instability and war,

in which the

states in the system attempt to constrain a member that
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threatens to dominate, (6 ) power polities, in general,
(7 ) a universal law of history,
to policy makers.^

and (8 ) a system and guide

Inis Claude views these various

definitions as being only three uses of the term:

a cer -

tain distribution of power, whether strength is spread
evenly among many,

or just a few, states, a certain type

of policy, which may include attempts at preponderance, as
weli as the formation of coalitions to check attempts at
hegemony, and a certain type of system consisting of in dependent states controlling their own power and policy.5
In examining the uses of the concept as he does, Claude
adds considerably to the accuracy of one who uses the term,
for he encourages one to use the balance of power to refer
only to a system.

When one wishes to speak in terms of a

policy, Claude believes that he should use the word policy
rather than balance of power.

References to a distribution

of power should call it that, rather than continuing to
cloud the meaning of a useful concept.
Before Claude undertook to examine the various uses
of the concept of the balance of power,

it was especially

difficult to develop a body of knowledge based upon the
works of predecessors,

due to the tendency to believe that
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any one theorist had failed to describe all of the features
of the balance of power.

This caused people to seek to add

continuously to the concept in an effort to insure that all
bases were touched.

This meant, however, that the concept

of the balance of power could never escape a circular
route by which it was described and redescribed.

It is

now possible, however, to carefully consider the implica tions of some of the particular features of the balance of
power, for the idea should now be limited to a particular
system.

This

allows one to

examine the term in one light,

thus allowing

for a greater

degree of accuracy and

scientific inquiry.
Using balance of power to denote a particular type of
system will allow one to be precise in his communication
of his thoughts to others, provided that the features of
such a system axe described adequately.

This will provide

theorists with an absolute point from which to work when
attempting to build a theory and will insure that any
attack upon a

particular theory will not be due to a mis -

understanding

of the manner

in which terms are used,but

rather will center upon the nature of the theory itself and
its ability to describe particular characteristics of

international politics.
In examining the literature that has been written in
recent years concerning the balance of power, however, one
finds that two things have been neglected.

The first is

that there have been no attempts to correct the imprecision
that exists in some of Inis Claude's discussion of the
balance of power in his book Power and International
Relations, while the second is that several potentially
useful concepts introduced by Claude have not been explored
as thoroughly as they deserve to be.

Vernon Van Dyke notes

that Claude has recommended that the term balance of power
should be used to describe a system, but then fails to go
any further in examining Claude's work.6

Dougherty and

Pfaltzgraff also mention Claude but fail to analyze any of
his concepts in detail.?

This is unfortunate, for it would

seem that one could use Claude's analysis of the balance
of power as a reference point for further study once some
of the imprecision has been eliminated.

I shall therefore

devote a portion of this thbsis to an explanation of Claude'
notions concerning the balance of power, paying particular
attention to the three types of policy that he suggests may
be used by the states within the system, automatic,
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semi - automatic, and manual.
In attempting this, I shall construct first a model
of a balance of power system.

In building this model,

I

will attempt to correct some difficulties that I believe
exist in Claude's work - most notably distinguishing between
a balancer and an operator in a balance of power system.
Having constructed a balance of power model,
develop a paradigm of a bipolar system,

I will then

introducing the

concept of contagious competition which I have borrowed
from Maurice Duverger and adapted to an international
setting.

Both of these models will be based upon the as -

sumption that it is security interests that cause states
to act as they do.

With this in mind, an attempt will be

made to determine the logical features of a balance of power
system and of a bipolar system, treating security interests
as an independent variable, with the behavior of the states
in the system being a dependent variable.

Once a logical

relationship has been established, perceptions of security
will be manipulated (from dependence upon one's own
abilities to dependence upon the smooth operation of the
system) to determine the logical effects of such alterations
upon the dependent variable.

The number of essential.

actors (those states capable of exerting influence upon any
other state within the system) is also viewed as an indepen
dent variable, with logical inferences being drawn from a
change in their number from two to three or more.
In developing these models I make no claim to an
explicit representation of reality, past, present,
future.

or

References in this thesis to real situations are

made only in an effort to clarify theoretical assumptions
posited? they sire not an attempt to explain these situations
I am also aware of the possibility that certain features
i

of my paradigms are present in all types of international
systems.

The paradigms constructed here are designed to

represent optimally functioning systems based upon security
interests.

Such optimal models are constructed in prefer -

ence to describing any particular system that may be dis covered in history due to the difficulty of uncovering what
may be regarded as "pure” examples.

An example of such a

difficulty is that of determining whether the ancient Greek
rivalry between Athens and Sparta was an example of a
balance of power system or of a bipolar system.

I would

classify it in the former category? yet, many might well
believe it to belong to the latter classification.

This
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difference of opinion could well distract a reader from the
theoretical examination being made.

The construction of a

model not purporting to depict a particular part of reality
aids in overcoming this problem, for it allows one to ex amine the validity of the argument being presented, rather
than the correctness of the classification made.

Further -

more, the construction of a "pure" system aids in the
elimination of much of the ambiguity found in real situa tions.
The value of a work examining such pure systems may
be questioned.

The answer to such questioning is that such

a study is useful to the extent that it allows future ob servers to predict the behavior of a state in particular
situations.

A knowledge of the logical behavior of a state

in either a bipolar system or a balance of power system in
which security is the motivating force provides the observer
with at least partial grounds upon which to judge how such
a state may behave.

While security interests are not the

only factors affecting a state's behavior,

I posit that in

certain instances, these interests are the overriding force
behind a state's behavior.

To the extent that this is true,

a knowledge of the logical consequences of such behavior
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allows for prediction.

Predictability is enhanced by sub -

dividing a balance of power system into automatic, semi automatic,

and manual systems,

and a bipolar system into

automatic and manual systems, allowing one to determine the
type of system in operation and the logical behavior that
may be expected of states in such a system.
In comparing the two paradigms I construct in this
thesis,

I wish to prove the hypothesis that the differences

in the manner in which a balance of power system and a
bipolar system operate are due to the differences in the
number of essential actors found in each system, the bipolar
system having only two such actors, while a balance of power
system has three or more.

I will attempt to show that this

difference in the number of essential actors affects the
type of competition found in each system, with only the
bipolar system having contagious competition, the extent
to which the states in each system engage in ideological
and nationalistic conflicts, the type of alliance structures
found in each system, and the nature of the arms buildups.
In discussing power,

I shall confine myself largely to

military power at the expense of economic power, both to
simplify the discussion somewhat,

and because my own
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knowledge of economics is rather limited.
This thesis is therefore designed as a modeling exer cise in which I will attempt to illustrate some of the
concepts Professor Claude developed in his analysis of the
balance of power,
petition,

introduce the notion of contagious com -

and show that while two international systems may

be structurally similar,

a change in the number of essential

actors from two to three or more can indeed cause these
systems to differ in their operation.
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CHAPTER I
A SYSTEM, A DISTRIBUTION, AND A POLICY

A balance of power system is an arrangement within
which states act autonomously, without the controlling
direction of a superior a.gencyt to manipulate power re lationships among themselves.i

These relationships are

manipulated by the various states in an attempt to cope
with the "security dilemma.”

This term is used to refer

to the inability of the states in the system to develop a
sense of security due to the threat that they pose to one
another.

Each state feels that the behavior of the other

states within the system may create a dangerous environ ment.

Thus,

each state feels compelled to build its power

in an effort to increase its security.

An increase in the

strength of one state, which may develop greater security
for it, is viewed as a threat by its neighboring states and
tends to develop more insecurity for them.

This causes

them to build their strength in an effort to decrease their
insecurity.

Such a development,

however, has the effect

of causing other states to feel insecure and in need of
more power.

Thus, a cycle develops in which the security

1^
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of one state is obtained only by creating insecurity among
other states.

The advancement in power by one state is

viewed with jealousy and uneasiness by the remaining states
in the system rather than with an eye to indifference.2
This means that unless there is some sort of superior
agency to regulate the power relationships among states in
such a way as to create an equal sense of security among
them all, these states will have a tendency to manipulate
these relationships themselves in an effort to obtain
security,

and competition will emerge as the means by which

power is managed in the s y s t e m . 3
A balance of power system is a decentralized system;
power and policy remain in the hands of its constituent
units.

Concern with developing greater strength causes

the system to have alliances as states attempt to enhance
their power both by building up their resources,
linking themselves to the power of other states.

and by
The

system has particular features but does not move toward
any particular result, apart from the prevention of hegemony
by one state or alliance over the remainder of the system,
since the primary actors - the states - are not so much
concerned with ends as they are with the means by which

they may feel secure.

In such a system,

statesmen do not

deal with abstractions (such as ideologies) but work with
the realities of international politics,

particularly those

involving national military strength and the threats it may
pose.^

The competitive nature of the system dictates that

this be true, since competition makes the political power
in the system expansionist by nature,5 requiring that states
men work to expand the political influence of their state,
while at the same time seeking to limit the influence of
other states in the system.

This tends to make security

something that is ever sought but never actually attained
by any state in the system.

It also tends to give the

system at once both a potential for creativity, as states m e n continuously seek new means for the pursuit of security,
and a potential for destruction, since the competitive na ture of the system tends to insure that states within the
system will clash with one another in wars as their
interests come into conflict.6
Every balance of power system must include a state
that is capable of being a b a l a n c e r . 7

This means that the

system must have enough members that there is the possi bility that two or more can combine in an alliance in order
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to offset the power of any state that threatens to dominate
the system.

When there is a state with the potential to

dominate the system, then the other states within the
system will seek to balance its strength by forming a league
of defense.

Power must be distributed in such a way that

no state will inherently dominate the system, and the
states in the system must be free to maneuver to form
leagues of defense.

In the formation of such a league,

it

is the state which initiates the discussion of its crea tion that may be called the balancer.

Thus, the balancer

is whichever state becomes concerned at the rising power
of some other state in the system and determines that its
power must be countered.

This means that the role of

balancer need not always be played by the same state, that
this state need not be a particularly powerful state (for
it need only be perceptive), and that the precise state
that plays the role of balancer may be vague in many s i t 
uations, especially if several states become aware of the
danger posed by a neighbor at nearly the same time.

The

central role that alliances and leagues of defense play in
a balance of power system dictates that there is always a
balancer in such a system.

In the past, balance of power systems have always
tended to develop in a particular region.

This is sug -

gested by Herbert Butterfield when he says that "states of
Renaissance Italy, like those of ancient Greece, formed a
neat,

closed area in which the principle might be expected

to develop."^

This would be a natural development since

the power politics that nurture the development of a
balance of power system grow out of the "security dilemma,"
which would tend to dictate that a state concern itself
with the threats posed by immediate neighbors.

A state

that is too far away to bring her strength to bear poses
little danger no matter how powerful she may be.

Arnold

Toynbee illustrates this well in the following passage:
At the center (of the group of states forming
the balance of power system), every move that
one state makes with a view to its own aggrandize ment is jealously watched and adroitly countered
by all its neighbors, and the sovereignty over
a few square feet of territory and a few hundred
"souls" becomes the subject of the bitterest and
stubbornest contention.... In the easy circum stances of the periphery, quite a mediocre
political talent is often able to work wonders....
The domain of the United States can be expanded
unobstrusively right across North America from
the Atlantic to the Pacific, the domain of Russia
right across Asia from Baltic to Pacific, in an
age when the best statesmen of France or Germany
can not avail to obtain unchallenged possession
of an Alsace or a Posen.9
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Thus, states that are situated close to one another care fully watch each other’s behavior out of a fear that any
additions to the power of one will directly threaten the
security of the other, while states that are not in the
same region go unnoticed, since the power that they may
accumulate is of little consequence unless it can be de livered effectively upon states that are at a distance
from it.
This produces an unwillingness on the part of states
in a balance of power system to compromise on issues that
arise within the region in which the system exists, since
these issues will tend to be viewed as vital, while at the
same time creating a propensity on the part of these same
states to bargain and compromise with one another when the
controversy at hand involves issues that do not arise
within the region.

As these extra - regional controversies

take place closer to the region in which the system exists,
however, the ability of the states in the region to com promise lessens.

Hans Morgenthau points this out when he

states that the most explosive extra - European issues of
the period from 1870 to 1910 involved an area situated
relatively close to the balance of power system itself - the
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division of the disintegrating Turkish Empire among the
European powers.10
David Hume,

in his essay "Of the Balance of Power,"

lists several examples of instances in which balance of
power systems have existed.

He states that Thucydides

describes such a system in his account of the Peloponnesian
War,

in which a league was formed among Grecian states to

combat the rise in the strength of Athens.

He speaks of

the manner in which Mediterranean states banded together
in an effort to counter the rising power of Alexander in
order that they could avoid the tyranny of a universal
monarchy.

He also discusses the rise of a balance of power

system in Europe in the wake of the power of the House of
Austria.1 *

In each instance, Hume illustrates the regional

nature of the system by describing the manner in which it
was a product of what was perceived as a threat by an im mediate neighbor.

It is interesting to note that there is

a trend in which the size of the area in which the system
exists increases, from the Grecian states, to the Eastern
Mediterranean states,

to the European states.

This would

seem to be, at least in part, due to the increasing size
of states and to their increasing ability through technology
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and communications to bring their strength to bear upon
other states.
It would seem possible that balance of power systems
might not only coexist adjacent to each other in differing
regions, but also alongside each other in the same region,
thereby forming sub - balance of power systems within a
larger regional balance of power system.

Morgenthau iden -

tifies such sub - balance of power systems as being local,
citing the development of an Italian balance of power
system in the fifteenth century as an example of such a
system, with the larger system being composed of the great
nations of Europe.*2

Such a local system might be said to

have existed in the Balkans where Austria, Russia, and
Serbia were poised just prior to World War I, but where
France, Germany, and Britain were primarily interested only
to the extent that no single state would dominate the area,
and over the control of Belgium during the same period
where Great Britain, France, and Germany all had interests,
while Austria and Russia were not actually drawn into the
contest.

These local systems tended to develop out of con -

tests among neighboring states over a particular issue in
which these states were especially interested, believing
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that vital interests were at stake.

It should not, how -

ever, be surmised that these local issues were not of
significance to the remaining states in the regional
system, for they were.

The distinction that can be made,

however, is that while the states in a local balance of
power system were constantly and daily concerned with these
issues, the other states in the region could afford to
neglect the issues so long as it did not appear that it
would be resolved in the favor of one of the states in the
local system.

As long'as competition among the states in

the local system existed, the remaining states in the
region could afford to partially ignore the issue; however,
when competition threatened to cease, then all of the states
in the region had cause for alarm lest the repercussions
of this lack of competition be felt by them, due to an in crease in strength by one particular state.
Thus, when one speaks of a balance of power system,
one is speaking of an arrangement within which states act
autonomously, have control over their own power and policy,
are free to form alliances, do not have any particular goal
in mind toward which they are moving other than to prevent
hegemony by others, and concern themselves with the
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realities of power politics rather than with commitments
to such abstractions as ideologies.

Such a system may be

of a regional nature (at least it has been so in the past)
and has enough members that one can serve as balancer.
Within any balance of power system there is a dis tribution of power.

The manner in which power is dis -

tributed calls to mind the Newtonian system of astronomy.
All the various bodies, the greater and the lesser powers,
are poised against one another, each exercising a kind of
gravitational pull on all the rest - and the pull of each
is proportionate to its mass and its distance.13

As the

distance becomes too great, or its size too small, a par ticular body is eliminated from consideration as a member
of the system.

In such a situation, gravity depicts the

strength a state possesses, and the distribution of mass
among the bodies in the system determines what type of
system will exist.

If the bodies within the system are

approximately equal in mass, then they will pull almost
equally upon neighboring states, and no one state, or group
of states, will dominate.

A group of bodies could have a

greater mass than the rest, therefore having a greater pull
than the others, thus dominating the system.

It is also
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possible for one state to dominate by being so much larger
than the rest that it can exert enough pull to control the
behavior of all the others.
In speaking of the distribution of power, one usually
refers to one of these situations:

an even distribution,

a distribution within which a group of states is dominant,
or a distribution that gives preponderance to a particular
state. I**’ A balance of power system may be said to function
best when power in the system is distributed either evenly
among all states, or among a rather large group of states
in the system.

This is so because the "security dilemma”

dictates that all of the states within the system would
ideally like to dominate it, but that when it is not pos sible for a state to dominate the system, then it would
feel most secure if power were distributed rather evenly
among a large number of states.

Thus, reacting to main -

tain an equilibrium is the nature of the balance of power
system because it is when all states are more or less equal
in strength, or belong to alliances that have equal power,
that they feel least threatened and most secure.^5
This means that it is most difficult, if not im possible, for a balance of power system to function when
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the distribution of power gives preponderance to one par ticular state.

In such a situation, it becomes necessary

for the remaining states in the system to remain members
of a league of defense almost constantly in order that they
may offset the power of their neighbor, if indeed their
collective power is sufficient to do so.

Such a require -

ment tends to place great strains upon the system due to
the problems inherent with the maintenance of an alliance.
It becomes possible for the powerful state to play upon the
jealousies and arguments among the states belonging to the
league and to pry members away from it through flattery and
promises, causing the league to fail in its purpose,
leaving the less powerful states individually to its mercy.
For the states in the league to allow themselves to be
broken apart in such a manner would not be wise, but it
would be natural, for the competition among states that
aids in the management of power in a balance of power
system does not vanish totally with the formation of an
a

l

l

i

a

n

c

e

.

Thus, while it is possible that a balance of

power system can operate when the distribution of power
gives preponderance to a particular state, it is doubtful
that it will operate with success over long periods of time
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in such a situation.
A balance of power system operates most successfully
when power is distributed in such a manner as to allow a
number of states to participate actively, for the greater
the number of active players, the greater the number of
possible combinations and the greater also the uncertainty
as to the combinations that will actually oppose each
other and as to the role individual players will actually
perform in them.^7

This means ideally that power should

be distributed among all of the states in the system in
order that they may all engage in the competition and
maneuvering that insures them the greatest amount of
security.

If strength is not distributed evenly among all

of the states in the system, then it is best for the main tenance of the system that it be distributed among several
strong states since the desire for security and the natural
urge to compete will cause these states to be unable to
ally together to dominate the system, thus at least par tially insuring the security of all states in the system,
except in instances when the partition of one of the weaker
states is deemed necessary for the preservation of the
system.

A wide distribution of power among a number of
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stronger states means that aggression cannot succeed un less it is so moderate and so directed that the prevailing
opinions of the other stronger powers approve it.*®

This

at least gives the lesser powers in the system the oppor tunity to appeal to the major states and play them off
against each other when they are threatened, making them
more secure than they would be if power were more narrowly
distributed.
Thus, an examination of the distribution of power in
a balance of power system allows one to investigate the
policies of the states within the system to observe how
they may react to balance the increase in the strength of
any particular member, or members, of the system.

The

manner in which states maintain an even distribution of
power is determined by the policy they pursue.

(Policy is

used here to connote an overall plan which takes all known
contingencies into account.

Strategy is the term that will

be used in dealing with any particular contingency).

Inis

Claude lists three types of policy that can be used by a
state when it manipulates power relationships in a balance
of power systems

automatic, semi - automatic, and manual.*9

Automatic operation of the balance of power system is
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reminiscent of the operation of physical laws.

A passage

from Rousseau describes its
The actual system of Europe has precisely the
degree of solidity which maintains it in a
constant state of motion without upsetting it.
The balance existing between the power of
these diverse members of the European society
is more the work of nature than of art. It
maintains itself without effort, in such a
manner that if it sinks on one side, it re establishes itself very soon on the other.20
Thus, the automatic operation of the balance of power
system occurs naturally when a member of the system
develops more strength.

It will occur naturally as a part

of the ’’security dilemma."

Any increase in the power of

one part of the system will cause anxiety among the other
members of the system.

This will cause them to pursue

strategies by which they may increase their strength to
balance, or even to surpass, that of other states.

It is

competition among the states in the system that insures
that an equilibrium will be maintained, for no one state
will be allowed to get too far ahead of the others.

If

any one state, or group of states, begins to threaten
hegemony, then the balancer signals to the remaining states
that it is necessary to form a league of defense, thus
reestablishing an equilibrium.
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States that act according to an automatic policy are
not necessarily aware of the existence of a balance of
power system as such, and if they are, they do not regard
the smooth functioning of the system as a guarantee of
their security.

It is quite possible that all of the mem -

bers of the system would pursue a winning strategy - that
is, a strategy whose fulfillment would allow them to dom inate the system, if they had the ability to do so, even
though domination by one member might destroy the system.
In fact, all states actively participating in the system
will most probably aim not at a balance - that is,
equality - of power, but at superiority of power in their
own behalf.21

It is the pursuit of such a winning strategy

by several members of the system that allows it to balance
itself naturally.
Claude's concept of a semi - automatic operation of
the balance of power system is illustrated best by the
British policy toward the European system in the -nine teenth century.

Such a policy is suited best to instances

where the opposing sides are approximately equal in
strength and appeal to the operator.

It calls for a some -

what aloof position, from which the manipulator can
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maneuver to support first one, then the other side, de pending upon which party best suits the operator's in terests.

The operator is not permanently identified with

the policies of either of the opposing sides.

Its only

objective within the system is the maintenance of the system,
regardless of the concrete policies the prevailing side will
serve.

The operator has neither permanent friends nor ene -

mies; its only permanent interest is the maintenance of the
system, for it is in the proper functioning of the system
that it feels its security is served best.^2

As Sir Eyre

Crowe states:
History shows that the danger threatening the
independence of this or that nation has gener ally arisen at least in part, out of the momen tary predominance of a neighboring state at once
militarily powerful, economically efficient and
ambitious to extend its frontiers or spread its
influence, the danger being directly proportion ate to the degree of its power and efficiency,
and to the spontaneity or "inevitableness" of
its ambitions. The only check on the abuse of
political predominance derived from such a posi tion has always consisted in the opposition of
an equally formidable rival, or of a combination
of several countries forming leagues of defense.
The equilibrium established by such a grouping
of forces is technically known as the balance
of power, and it has become almost an historical
truism to identify England's secular policy with
the maintenance of this balance by throwing her
weight now in this scale and now in that, but
ever on the side opposed to the political
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dictatorship of the strongest single state or
group at a given time.23
Thus, the balancer in a semi - automatic scheme is aware of
the existence of a balance of power system and feels that
it is through the efficient working of such an arrangement
that her security is enhanced.

This awareness of the system

is a feature which helps differentiate semi - automatic from
automatic manipulation, even when two states behave similar ly.

Hume stated that after the Peloponnesian War, "the

Athenians always threw themselves into the lighter scale,
and endeavored to preserve the b a l a n c e . S u c h a policy
would appear the same as that which the British adopted in
the nineteenth century, for it sounds very similar to that
which Crowe enunciated.

The difference between the two

policies is in the fact that the British knew that a balance
of power system existed, and attempted to work within it,
while the Athenians did not.25

This may be due to the fact,

as Herbert Butterfield points out, that the notion of a
balance of power system was developed as a result of the
adaption of Newton's theory of a field of forces in as tronomy t o •international political theory.26
Semi - automatic manipulation is automatic in that the
operator will always throw its weight to whichever side is

deficient in strength.

This takes away at least part of the

element of choice that the operator may have, for while it
consciously estimates which side is weakest, it will always
pursue the single strategy of siding with whoever is weakest
on any given occasion.
It is worth noting some of the differences between the
balancer requisite to a balance of power system (who I shall
refer to as the balancer) and the operator using a semi automatic policy (who I shall call the operator in order
to avoid confusion).

In both cases, the states act in the

manner which best enhances their security, pursuing a
strategy which calls for siding with the weaker state in
order to offset an increase in strength by an opposing state
or group of states.

The difference lies in whether the

strategic act of siding with the less powerful is tied to
an overall policy or is conceived of as an expediency.

In

the case of the semi - automatic operator, the strategy is
a part of an overall policy which calls for placing one's
weight where it may serve to counter the rise of any state
to preponderance.

This policy is formulated with a know -

ledge of the existence of a balance of power system and with
the desire to play the role of an operator in such a system.
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The operator attempts to keep the system intact through its
actions because it feels its security, as well as that of
the other states in the system, is greatest when the system
functions smoothly.

This means that the operator may act

in behalf of the rest of the states in the system by playing
the role of balancer and maintaining the system.

In order

to be especially effective, the operator should be in an
aloof position in order that it can refrain from becoming
involved in all disputes - a position often referred to as
"splendid isolation,f*^7 concerning itself only with those
that it feels are of vital importance, and the operator must
be strong enough that it is able to tip the distribution of
power as it pleases when it commits itself.
The requisite balancer, however, is not of necessity
always the same state.

It can be any state who becomes

concerned enough by the growth in strength of a neighbor
that it seeks the formation of some sort of league of de fense.

Thus, the balancer is not pursuing any overall

policy that dictates a particular strategic decision, but
rather acts out of a desire to acquire more security.

This

balancer is not necessarily aware of the existence of a
balance of power system, as is the operator in semi - auto -

3^

matic manipulation, nor need the balancer be a state power ful enough to tip the distribution of power as it chooses.
It need only be perceptive enough to recognize the need for
a realignment of the distribution of power within the
system.

This means that, strictly speaking, the balancer

and the operator need not be the same state at all times,
even in a semi - automatically manipulated system, for it
is possible, though not probable, that a state other than
the operator would recognize the need for a reexamination
of the power relationships in the system and initiate the
discussion of such an examination.
Manual operation of the balance of power system is a
process within which the equilibrating process is a function
of human contrivance.

Reliance is placed neither on self -

equilibrating tendencies among all states, nor on the care fully timed and calculated adjustments performed by a holder
of the balance on behalf of other states.

The rise of this

type of policy places an emphasis upon the skilled manage ment of affairs by the statesmen who guide the actions of
all the states in the system.28

Manual operation depends

upon the realization by the statesmen that a balance of
power system exists and the belief that it is within such a

framework that their state is most secure.

It relies fur -

ther upon the realization that a certain, tacitly agreed
upon, body of rules must be created to guide the actions of
the states in the system.

Thus, a manually operated

balance of power system is one in which the members of the
system attempt to institutionalize the system somewhat,
taking it off the ad hoc basis found to a large extent in
both automatically and semi - automatically operated
systems.

The states in the system attempt to guarantee

their security by developing a code of conduct that will
temper their behavior.

Agreements are reached regarding

the distribution of power that will work best to maintain
the system, in order that clashes due to attempts to gather
ever greater amounts of strength will not threaten the
system.
Morton Kaplan sets forth a set of basic rules which
would tend to be tacitly agreed to in a manually operated
system.

The rules are that states would:

capabilities,

1.

increase

but negotiate rather than fight? 2.

rather than fail to increase capabilities; 3.

fight

stop fight -

ing rather than eliminate an essential actor; 4.

oppose

any coalition or single actor which tends to assume a
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position of predominance within the system; 5*

constrain

actors who subscribe to supranational organizational, prin ciples; and 6.

permit defeated or constrained essential

national actors to reenter the system as acceptable role
partners, or act to bring some previously unessential actor
within the essential actor classification.

All essential

actors must be treated as acceptable role partners.^9

Ac -

ceptance of these rules would tend to insure that while the
states in the system would continue to compete with one
another, they would have a set of guidelines to follow that
could insure the preservation of the system on any particu lar occasion.
The use of a manual policy is due to the awareness the
manipulators have of the "security dilemma," and the feeling
that it dictates that no state or alliance shall attempt to
gather enough power to dominate the system.

Whereas states

may have chosen to pursue a winning strategy in using an
automatic policy, the acceptance of a manual policy dictates
that winning strategies that would destroy the system must
be abandoned.

This type of policy is complex, for it calls

for a great amount of consensus among the statesmen within
the system in order that it may be maintained.

This

3?

requires that a very good communications network must exist
to allow the leaders of the states to communicate with one
another when problems develop to insure that no crisis ever
causes a state to act unilaterally before everyone’s in tent ions Eire known.
In summary, it can be said that there are three types
of policies that states may pursue in a balance of power
system:

automatic, semi - automatic, and manual.

These

policies are a product of whether none of the states, some,
but not all of the states, or all of the states within the
system are aware of its existence and feel most secure
v/ithin such a system.
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CHAPTER II
THE BIPOLAR SYSTEM
A.

STRUCTURE AND SECURITY

The distribution of power in a bipolar world is such
that two states, which shall be designated as super powers,
have an overwhelming array of strength.

This creates two

definite classes of states, the super powers, and all other,
lesser states.

The latter may vary in size and strength,

but their power is hardly comparable to that of the super
powers.

As in other models of the international system,

there is no superior agency to direct and control power
relationships in the system, for power and policy remain
in the hands of its constituent units - the states.

All

the states in the system are therefore responsible for
maintaining their own security, for there is no other body
to do this for them.

This means that the states must seek

to build their power in the belief that strength brings
security.

In such a situation, competition among the states

emerges as the means by which power in the system is
managed.

Each state attempts to build its power to match

the advances in strength made by such other states as are
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in a position to pose a threat to its security.

Such com -

petition manages power in the sense that it guarantees that
no particular state will be able to amass enough strength
to enable it to dominate the system.

Competition does not,

however, manage power in the sense that particular amounts
of strength are delegated to specific states as a part of
some sort of grand plan for the distribution of power within
the system.
The competition for power in a bipolar system takes
place at two fairly distinct levels, global and regional.
The global level is dominated by the super powers, while
regional competition may take place without interference
from the super powers, although,
such intervention may occur.

in particular situations,

That competition takes place

at two levels is due to the circumstances that present them selves to the actors in the bipolar system.

On the one

hand, the super powers must, out of necessity,

play the

global game, for they pose distinct threats to each other
which demands that they strive for power vis a vis each
other.

At the same time, the super powers may well perceive

that they have vital interests spread throughout the various
regions of the earth, which compels them to engage in re -

h2

gional struggles for power from time to time to protect
these interests.
One finds that the lesser states are in the complicated
position of feeling the pressure of threats to their
security from several, sources - the super powers, lesser
states in the same region, and perhaps even some lesser
powers from other regions.

This dictates that the lesser

states keep a watchful eye upon the global competition,
seeking to build an alliance or understanding of some sort
with one or the other of the super powers who will guaran tee their security.

At the same time, the lesser states

must concern themselves with the machinations of the various
states in their own region.

This dictates that they develop

some regional ties that will assist them in the event of
aggression in their particular region.

These ties would

be intra - regional rather than extra - regional.

A super

power is only likely to guarantee a state’s position with
regard to intra - regional aggression if that particular
state is of vital importance to it, or if the aggression
appears to be directed by the other super power.

Lesser

states may also seek ties with a super power in order to
secure its support in regional conflicts.

^3

The lesser powers must also concern themselves with
activities in other regions that they deem to be of vital
interest to themselves.

Thus, they need to develop a net -

work of contacts in other regions that will help to insure
that events will not take such a turn as to damage these
interests.

The recent Arab oil embargo and its effect upon

all of the industrial states of the world illustrates the
necessity of such contacts.

Indeed the French agreement

with Iran regarding nuclear reactors and oil purchases il lustrates an attempt by a state in one region to develop
contacts in another region in order to offset possible
developments that might prove to be detrimental.
Despite all the complexities involved,

competition in

a bipolar world system revolves very particularly around the
two super powers.

This is true because the super powers

alone have sufficient power to threaten and destroy any
other state in the system.
remaining states,

Thus, the very existence of the

and of the system itself, depends upon

the super powers and their ability to check one smother.
Should one of the super powers surpass the other, the
system itself could reach the point where all states would
find themselves subservient to the wishes of the prevailing

super power.

On the other hand, if the competition leads

to war between the super powers, the system, and the states
within the system,

could be annihilated.

This means that

all eyes in the system are, of necessity, upon the struggle
between the big tv/o.
B.

CONTAGION AND THE AUTOMATIC SYSTEM

The competition between the super powers revolves
around two perceptions of how they may best maintain their
security.

The first view involves the belief that security

is a function of o n e ’s own individual efforts, while the
second tends to attach security more to an optimally func tioning state system.

In this latter system, each state

remains the ultimate guardian of its own interests, but a
set of principles is developed to guide the conduct of the
states within the system in order that differences among
these states may be resolved short of war.

The type of

competition associated with the first perception is zero sum, while that associated with the second is nonconstant sum.
Zero - sum competition regards a gain for any state as
an absolute loss for all other actors within the system.*
In a zero - sum situation,

the competition between the super

^5

powers develops a particular ruthlessness that enters into
every phase of the international system, with each pushing
the other to extremes limited only by each side's counter acting power.

The potential for accommodation and com -

promise diminishes under such circumstances, for neither
side is able to afford the possibility that an agreement
may break down, leaving it at a disadvantage.
Nonconstant - sum competition, in contrast to zero sum, is characterized by the belief that advances by one
state do not at all times automatically translate into
losses for all other states, though it is recognized that
at times they may.

There is a realization that all dif -

ferences between states are not irreconcilable, that co operation is possible in certain circumstances where it may
add to one's security, and that some agreements may be
reached permitting all states in the system to benefit.2
Opportunities for accommodation and compromise are explored
when possible; however, competition for the sake of main taining security remains.

Policies that are guided by the

nonconstant - sum view may be designated as manual, while
those that are guided by the zero - sum approach are auto matic.

Automatic policies have no explicit recognition of

h6

any systematic manner of handling disputes, while manual
policies are conscious of this possibility but are equally
aware of the fact that it is not always possible to resolve
disputes in this manner,

and that the ultimate guarantee of

security rests in o n e ’s own defenses.
The competition between super powers adhering to auto matic policies will develop a contagious nature similar to
that described by Maurice Duverger in his discussion of two
party systems.3

This means that any means that one super

power uses toward the end of accumulating power must be
adopted by the other super power as well.
to two factors:

Contagion is due

the inability of the super powers to form

alliances with other states to help maintain their security
with regard to one another,

and the constant awareness of

exactly who the primary opponent is.

The inability to form

an alliance to aid in the global struggle forces the super
powers to rely almost exclusively upon their own ability to
increase their strength.

One super power cannot afford the

luxury of allowing the other to leap ahead of it in strength,
for there is virtually no possibility of countering such an
increase through the formation of some sort of league of
defense with other states.

Each super power must remain

in a state of constant vigilance, matching the tactics and
devices used by the other side in order to avoid the pos sibility of falling too far behind.
At the same time, both super powers are able to closely
monitor one another to determine precisely what strategies
and weapons systems are available in the search for power.
This information,

together with the knowledge that the other

super power would be one’s sure opponent in the event of
an armed conflict,

places a tremendous amount of pressure

upon both super powers to adopt any device that the other
appears to be developing that may add to its strength.
This means, of course, that successful, as well as some un successful, strategies will be copied for o n e ’s own use.
The perceptions that the super powers have of the
realities of the system have a great impact upon their be havior.

An objective appraisal of the power relationships

in the system,

if it were possible, would give each super

power the ability to see precisely what contribution
particular devices and strategies used by the opponent would
make to his power.

Calculations would then be made re -

garding the usefulness of employing a similar device.
pressures of the international system,

The

however, make such
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objectivity difficult to obtain, and subjective and biased
assessments are likely to inflate the importance of certain
devices or strategies,

causing the super powers to compete

in areas where a gain may be of little importance.
Under such conditions,
even inevitable,

it is quite likely, perhaps

that competition for the sake of staying

numerically ahead of one’s opponent emerges as the central
guiding principle of the policies of the super powers,
rather than a competition that is linked to the necessities
of security.^

Thus, the drive to secure new weapons

systems may outstrip the security need.

Both super powers

may be in possession of what may be viewed as the ultimate
weapon (i.e. nuclear weapons), and may even have a suf ficient number of the weapons stockpiled to totally destroy
the opponent, and yet continue to engage in an extremely
expensive and dangerous game of attempting to quantitatively
outstrip o n e ’s opponent.

The reason for this seeming madness
1

lies primarily in the functioning of the system, for both
super powers are well aware of almost precisely the number
and types of weapons the other possesses and are sorely
tempted to have just a few more in order to have a slight
edge,

although the degree to which this may enhance one's
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security may be negligible.
Qualitative development follows much the same pattern,
with both super powers being aware of the degree of
sophistication each possesses.

This places pressure upon

both to match or surpass the weapons technology of the
other, leading to the development of ever more complex
systems of destruction, which may or may not add appreciably
to the security of either side.
The urge to engage in this type of competition is de rived from the automatic nature of the system, where a gain
for one side is viewed as being virtually equivalent to a
loss for the other.

This causes each side to strive to keep

pace with or outstrip the other, even when such competition
is likely to add greater danger to the system through the
creation of ever more sophisticated means of destroying it.
In a system in which no ultimate weapon yet exists, and
v/here conventional weapons alone are available to the members
of the system, such competition may indeed bring about a
measurable increase in the security of the states involved,
but only up to a certain point.

Even in this situation, a

time is reached where increases, such as in the number of
soldiers,

guns, etc. do not actually bring an appreciably
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greater degree of security.

One may, however, draw the

distinction that this threshold is reached sooner when both
sides are dealing with an ultimate system such as nuclear
weapons.
The contagious competition between the super powers,
however,

does not limit itself to an arms race.

Rather it

reaches deeply into every aspect of their relations both
with one another and with the rest of the states in the
system.

Contagion touches ideological conflicts,

competition,

and the formation of alliances.

economic

The striving

for security inherent in the system causes the super powers
to grasp at any means available that could offer to increase
their strength.

This couples with the fact that the super

powers are posed against one another as declared enemies.
In such a situation,

it is natural that both sides would

believe that their own position is the morally "correct”
one and that the opposition is wrong insofar as it strays
from that position.

Passions become principles,

noble causes, and conflicts crusades.5

ambitions

It is but a short

step from espousing such views to setting them down as a
theoretical guide for o n e ’s followers.
has been produced,

Once such a guide

one may say that the super power has an
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ideology,

a means which may be used in an effort to convert

or confuse members of the opposition.

The use of such a

tool by one super power quite readily calls for its use by
the other,

and an ideological conflict between the super

powers arises.

The power of such a weapon is great, for

ideas, by their very nature are universal, with their only
passport being their moral and logical validity.6

In order

to undermine one’s opponent, one only has to think and
speak, to promise a better life.
The use of the ideological tool theoretically may take
place on two levels:
bate,

it may be a part of a reasoned de -

or it may be projected as a part of the passionate

conflicts between the super powers.

It is on the second

level that the tool is used, for it allows the governments
to stir up the moral indignation of their own people and the
peoples of other states without having ever to concede a
point of argument to the opposition - as one must often do
in a more reasonable debate.
always appear to be right,
wrong.

On the second level, one may

portraying the other side as

The statesmen involved may actually and passionately

believe they are correct, or they may be cynically using
ideology as a means of acquiring greater influence both
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abroad and at home.

In either case, the effect is much the

same, for a hot and heavy firing of salvos of propaganda
occurs, with each side attempting to influence followers of
the other, not so much by the use of reason,

as through the

use of moral heat.
Propaganda may be used to undermine the other super
power domestically and internationally.

Domestically, one

may seek to create pockets of opposition that may eventually
flower into a fifth column of a sort, while internationally,
one may seek to isolate o n e ’s opponent by raising questions
regarding its conduct and policies, and by holding out a
better future through the acceptance of o n e ’s own creed of
conduct.
Propaganda may have a profound effect upon the domestic
operation of the government,
Dissent,

particularly in a democracy.

a cherished freedom in democracies, may come to be

regarded as comforting the enemy and as the stirrings of a
fifth column in support of the opposition.

Such thoughts

are made much easier by the fact that the democratic leaders
themselves, whether knowingly or not, will tend to cloud
their own reason by paying too close attention to their own
propaganda.

Moves to quash dissidents are made in the name
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of democracy and for reasons of national security.

The

truth itself is even disguised to fit one's own propaganda,
and policies are kept as secret as possible in order that
they will not be seen to contradict the banal declarations
of propaganda.

Ideological conflict and the extensive use

of propaganda may have the effect of causing a democracy to
accept as necessary some of the repressive methods of a
totalitarian state (particularly if it competes against a
totalitarian super power, which may seem to have an ad vantage because it can control its population) in order to
cover up the weakness - lack of secrecy - de Tocqueville
detected in the operation of the foreign office of a
democracy.7
Such an ideological conflict creates a situation in
which the statesmen of both super powers become prone to
abstractions, viewing the world through the tainted lenses
of morali2ations, rather than concerning themselves with
the concrete realities of the world about them.
situation,

these leaders come to believe it sinful to

negotiate with the other side.
question,

In such a

Compromises are out of the

for to make a concession would be morally wrong.

Thus, the leaders on both sides tend to unrealistically

5^

expect the other to admit its moral bankruptcy and to give
in.

This fails to occur, and since compromise is not pos -

sible, the conflict rages on with no promise of an end,
and with both attempting to reform the other by pouring
propaganda upon its groups of supporters in an effort to
erode its power base.
In the automatic bipolar system,

alliances with super

powers are sought by the lesser states in order that these
states may secure themselves from the threat posed by one
or the other of the super powers*

In securing such an al -

liance, the states feel that they not only secure themselves
from the threat of a super power, but also add greatly to
their security with regard to other, neighboring, lesser
states.

The super powers, on the other hand, may be expected

to engage in such alliances for one of two reasons;

out

of a desire to obtain a base of operation that will allow
for deployment of weapons systems closer to the opposing
super power, or out of a need to increase one’s strength in
a particular region.

The lesser states pursue alliances

out of a desire to increase enormously their power by adding
to it that of a super power, v/hile the super powers actually
add little to their already immense power through such
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alliances,

except insofar as they obtain more favorable

strategic positions vis a vis the other super power.
Thus, unaligned states may seek an alliance with a
super power if they feel particularly threatened by one or
the other of the super powers.
example.

Cuba may be taken as an

After the Revolution, the perceived threat from

the United States became great.

Therefore, the Castro re -

gime appealed to the Soviet Union for an alliance that
would aid in securing Cuba from an American invasion.

The

Soviet Union was ready to come to such an agreement for
entirely different reasons - b e c a u s e C u b a ’s proximity to
the United States would provide a base of operations ex ceedingly close to American soil.

In addition,

the zero -

sum competition within the system brought the Soviet Union
to perceive itself as having an opportunity to make a gain
that would be the equivalent of a loss to the other super
power, the United States.

Both sides benefited from such

an alliance, as indeed must be true before an agreement is
securable.
Another type of alliance is developed when one of the
super powers perceives a threat to a particular region that
it deems to be of great importance.

In this case the super
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power will seek to conclude an alliance with friendly
states in that region in an effort to strengthen itself in
that area.

This gain in strength occurs only in the region

in which the alliance is formed and does not extend to
other regions of the globe, nor does it have any effect
upon the power relationships between the super powers.
a regional alliance, however,

Such

is likely to prompt the other

super power to seek one of its own in order that it will
not fall behind in the competition for power.
The creation of alliances between lesser states and
super powers may be said, at least in the initial stages,
to give the super powers a remarkable degree of sway over
the policies of the lesser states.

This is due to the fact

that the lesser states are more dependent upon the super
powers than are the latter upon the former.

This is be -

cause the super powers possess the strength to protect their
territorial integrity from any threat, while the lesser
states are unable to protect themselves from the super
powers,

and indeed in many cases, even from other lesser

states in the same region.

Thus, the lesser states have a

primary security need for such an alliance, while the need
of the super powers is secondary - involving such things as

obtaining position over their rival and protecting economic
interests.

Primary security needs are those involving the

maintenance of o n e ’s territorial integrity, while secondary
needs are those which may affect the quality of existence
but are not directly related to the maintenance of ter ritorial integrity.
This means that alliance systems in a bipolar world
have a tendency to become rigid.

This rigidity is in large

part due to the fact that the lesser states generally have
only one of two choices open when seeking to protect their
security.

One is to ally with the super power which is

perceived as being most favorable to o n e ’s position; the
other is to remain unaligned,

and thus, neutral.

Should a

state choose the first course, then it commits itself to
the protective umbrella of a super power, finding that once
so protected,

it loses its ability to break free, both due

to the fear that without such protection it would - since
it is now marked as an accomplice of the opposition - be
dealt with fearfully,

and because it finds such protection

psychologically comforting and is unwilling to venture out
without such protective comfort.

Nonalignment may appear

as a reasonable alternative, but only for some states -
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principally those which are not in the path of confrontation
between the super powers and which feel no particular threat
from either.

Thus, the European states, lying as they do

in between the two super powers, may not remain uncommitted,
for their security is directly threatened by one or the
other of the super powers.

At the same time, the interests

of the super powers in Europe are so great that even should
certain key European states attempt to remain neutral, both
super powers would exert great pressure upon these states
to join in an alliance.
states,

Other states,

such as the African

are able to remain uncommitted both because they do

not feel directly threatened by either super power, and be cause they do not lie in an area that the super powers re gard as being of strategic importance,

and therefore scant

pressure is brought upon them to conclude an alliance.
It may be noted that even some states which are un committed actually have a tacit backing from one or the
other of the super powers in case of an emergency involving
the opposing super power.

India provides such an example.

While uncommitted throughout the 1950*s, there still re mained a tacit assumption that should the Soviet Union, or
some other Communist state (such as China), attempt
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aggression upon India, then the United States would inter vene on India’s behalf.

India was therefore free to

operate as a state independent of an American alliance, but
nonetheless protected by the American security shield.

In -

deed the same may be said of any nonaligned state, but with
less certainty, for the very rivalry of the super powers
tends to guarantee the independence and integrity of these
states, even in the absence of a tacit agreement,

just as

Russian and British rivalry insured the independence of
Afghanistan and Persia in the 19th century.8

Neither super

power is likely to sit idly by while the other forcibly
exerts its control over the uncommitted.

This is true

whether the state is in a particularly important region or
not.

In fact, the mere interest of one or the other super

power in a particular region has the effect of making that
region important to the other super power, and thus of in suring an interest in the proceedings.

Thus, the nonaligned

states are, in effect, also protected by the super powers.
Such protection does not, however, extend to conflicts
between lesser uncommitted states, unless it is suspected
that such conflict is inspired by a super power.
Among the states that do form alliances with the super

powers, either out of a fear of invasion from one or the
other of the super powers, or due to their strategic lo cations, there develops a distinct tendency, at least
during the earliest stages of this relationship,

for the

super power to dominate the policy of the lesser state.
This dominance is in large part a product of the threat
that the rival super power poses, and to the fact that the
only guarantee against that threat lies in the alliance
the lesser state has with its sponsoring super power.
Should this super power threaten to pull out of the al liance, an unlikely possibility as is later realized, then
the lesser state will become vulnerable.

In the event that

the super power pressured the lesser state into the al liance due to its strategic location, the super power still
has immense leverage, for the very strategic position of
the lesser state dictates that both super powers are in terested,

and should the alliance be dissolved, then the

distinct possibility exists that the rival super power
would rush in to fill the void.

Such a possibility ties

the lesser state to the super power.
The dependence of the lesser states upon super powers
for a protective umbrella tends to create a tendency for
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alliance systems to transform themselves into blocs.

The

difference between the two lies in the ability of the
states involved to dissolve the relationship.

In an al -

liance system, all states entering into the agreement are
given the opportunity to back out of the arrangement, while
in a bloc system, the lesser states are caught in the orbit
of a giant whose political, military,

and economic pre -

ponderance may hold them there even against their will.9
With the development of a two bloc system in which each
super power has its own orbit of lesser states,

the system

loses much of its flexibility and becomes rather rigid.
The development of the two bloc system does not give
the super powers total sway over the policies of their
allies.

Although these allies cannot leave their respective

orbits at their own volition, they can stay there either
as willing and effective supporters of the policies of the
super powers or as balky and unreliable captives,10

*phe

super powers thus attempt to maintain the belief among
their allies that they merely provide advice, and then only
when requested,

on policy matters.

In order to insure that

their allies do follow the correct line, however, the super
powers may rely on a number of devices ranging from military

62

and trade agreements to ideology and propaganda.

Propa -

ganda is used to portray the activities of the opposition
as evil and to exhort their allies to rally around in an
attempt to thwart such designs.
The super powers also seek to influence the policies
of their allies by using their vast array of technological
facilities to gather information that is then provided to
the lesser states to be used in the formation of policy.
Since policy is a product of one's perception of a particu lar situation,

and one's information helps one to perceive

what is happening, the super powers have great leverage in
determining what policies their allies will follow,

as long

as their allies are at least partially dependent upon the
data provided by the super power.
The type of relationship that exists between the
leader and the rest of the bloc may be characterized as
either loose or t i g h t . H

A loose relationship is one in

which the goals of the bloc are limited and where dis agreements not affecting these goals are permissible,*2

An

example may be taken from the Western bloc led by the United
States.

In this bloc, the only overall goal consisted of

containing Communism.

This meant that there was room for
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the discussion of what would be done regarding all other
questions,

and that differences of opinion among bloc m e m 

bers could be tolerated and would not overly threaten the
unity of the bloc.

Thus, the bloc was stable.

On the

other hand, a bloc may be considered tight if the goals of
the bloc are not limited,

and if the super power has an

almost unlimited power in determining what policies are to
be pursued by the members of the bloc.*3

The Communist bloc

may be seen as an example of a tight system.

The goal of

this bloc is to overwhelm the opposition and to extend
Communist influence.

In the. Communist bloc, the. Soviet

Union has great discretion in determining what policies
should be followed throughout the bloc.
have certain advantages,

Such a setup may

in that a unity of policy may be

expected at all times, but it may also be unstable.

This

instability stems from the difficulty the bloc may have in
meeting its goals and from the resentment felt at the dom inance of the super power.
difficult to realize,

Such far reaching goals are

and when not met may tend to create

disagreement over the methods that ought to be employed in
their pursuit.

One such disagreement developed in the

Communist camp between the Soviet Union and the Chinese

6k

over whether or not it was advisable to push the Western
bloc into an armed conflict*

At the same time, the lesser

states in a tight bloc may come to resent the dominance of
the super power and actually seek to leave the bloc.
Albania, Yugoslavia, Hungary,

Czechoslovakia, and China are

all examples of attempts to escape from the domineering
influence of the Soviet Union.

In a tight bloc, the chance

is great that the lesser states may be held as captives,
while in a loose bloc, the lesser states sire far more likely
to be cooperative and willing members of the bloc.

Thus,

the advantages that may be inherent in a unified policy in
a tight bloc may be largely lost due to the dissension
that may develop.
The domination that the super powers enjoy at the
onset of their alliances with the lesser states that come
to form their blocs wears thin as time passes.

This is

largely due to a realization on the part of the lesser
states that the competition between the two super powers
tends to guarantee that neither super power will abandon a
recalcitrant ally.

In the earliest stages of the formation

of alliances, the lesser states are overwhelmingly con cerned with enhancing their security as opposed to a
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menacing giant.

This may only be done by turning to the

other giant, providing of course that it appears less men acing.

During this time, the lesser states are not fully

aware of the importance that they may have in such a re lationship, for they are quite understandably concerned
with protecting themselves.
subsides,

however,

After the initial period of fear

the lesser states come to recognize

that they make a contribution to the interests of the super
power, not perhaps by adding significantly to its fire
power in the event of a conflict, but rather by providing
it with a base for operations and with support for its
policies in a particular region.

In addition to this, the

lesser states find that the intensity of the competition
between the super powers brings them to regard gains and
losses in a manner that is not directly proportionate to
their importance with regard to security.

While the loss

of a particular ally may be of no weighty importance, the
super powers, due to their intense competition,

come to

regard any loss at all as virtually intolerable.
powers therefore jealously guard their allies,
to keep them in the fold.

This,

The super

attempting

of course, brings the

allies to believe that they need not follow their leader's
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position in all matters and eventually helps to create the
stirrings of independence among the lesser states.
Such a growing desire for independence may have a pro found effect upon the stability of the bloc system,
particularly upon the tight bloc.

and

The tight bloc is

founded and developed upon the explicit leadership and
control of the super power, a situation in which the iden tity of the various states in the bloc is somewhat sub merged in favor of bloc unity.

A movement toward greater

identity and independence for the lesser states has the
effect of undermining the very basis upon which the bloc
structure is built.

Independence on the part of the states

in the tight bloc comes as a direct challenge to the
authority and leadership of the bloc leader, and whenever
successful, not only means a diminished role for the super
power, but also provides competition for the leader of the
bloc.
The effect of greater independence for the lesser
states in a loose bloc,
divisive.

on the other hand,

is not nearly so

This is largely due to the fact that the loose

bloc is not built so much upon dominance as it is upon co operation.

A move for greater independence on the part of
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the lesser states in the bloc does not come as a direct
challenge to the authority of the super power, and there fore,

in itself, does, not threaten the stability of the

bloc.

In comparing the effects of growing independence

upon the stability of blocs,

one may examine the movement

by China and France for independence.

China, as a member

of a tight bloc, posed a serious threat to bloc unity when
making a move for more independence.

Indeed, China is

viewed as a legitimate competitor with the Soviet Union
for the allegiance of the states in the bloc.

France’s

move for independence, on the other hand, has hardly had
the effect of creating a competitor for the United States
in the role of bloc leader.

This is largely because the

United States, as leader of the Western bloc, has never
explicitly sought to maintain an air of infallibility and
of total dominance.

Thus, a movement for greater independence

by a state in the bloc was not a direct challenge to
American leadership, but was little more than a glancing
blow (i.e. complaints were that consultation among allies
had not been complete enough, not that there was a total
lack of cooperation and consultation).
In the loose bloc, these problems may be dealt with

short of main force by reforming somewhat the structure of
the alliance and allowing for greater participation by the
lesser states in the formation of policy.
reforms,

the super power may at times act capriciously,

events may preclude prior consultation.
however,

Even with such
or

In such a bloc,

a premium is placed upon negotiation and compro -

mise among allies, rather than merely upon coercion (though
force may be used at times).
The tight bloc,
compulsion,

on the other hand, built as it is upon

is kept in line through coercion.

Movements

by lesser states for greater,independence and a larger role
in decision - making are viewed as being akin to treason
and are put down forcibly where it is possible to do so,
though it is not always possible.

The Soviet Union was able

to invade Czechoslovakia and force compliance with its
wishes in 1968 but has found that it has not been possible
to do so in China, Yugoslavia,

or Albania.

This is one factor that causes the "tight” super power
to be far more conservative in its policies than may
otherwise be the_case, for it must not only keep a watchful
eye upon the opposing camp, but it must also look out that
its own camp does not attempt to revolt and declare itself
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free of the tight bloc.

Thus, a super power in a loose bloc

may feel freer and may engage in a more adventuristic
foreign policy than a super power leading a tight bloc.
C.

THE MANUAL SYSTEM

A manually operated bipolar system is ambiguous, for
the super powers become conscious of the system within
which they exist and seek to manipulate this system in
order to enhance their security, while at the same time
keeping in reserve their own power in order that it might
serve as an ultimate guarantee of this security.

The am -

biguity is found in the fact that this may create a new
willingness for compromise and cooperation between the big
two, while at the same time they remain very wary of one
another.

In the manual system, one does not necessarily

find a high degree of trust, for the system continues to be
built upon distrust, as is the automatic system.

Nor does

one find a convergence of ideological systems, for both
super powers retain their faith in the correctness of their
view of the nature of things.

What one does find is that

the super powers have come to realize that the fierce com petition found in an automatic system is bound to end in a
devastating war and that the only manner in which to avoid
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such a conflict lies in cooperation between the super
powers to the extent that the bipolar system is preserved
and kept free from w a r . ^

The super powers realize that a

continued competition for the total domination of the
system will result only in the destruction of both the
system and the states within the system - with no one a
victor.

They come to believe that their security is en -

hanced when the system functions smoothly, with as little
tension as possible.
This does not mean that conflicts disappear entirely,
or that the super powers cease to have differences that
result in tension.

Contagious competition remains, for

the super powers continue to feel that they cannot allow
themselves to fall behind the other in strength, for if
this should occur, there is small possibility of redressing
the imbalance through an alliance with another state.

It

does mean, however, that such competition is toned down and
that there are negotiations to limit it as far as it is
possible to do so.

The super powers find that they must

weigh carefully the consequences of their actions and that
they must refuse to act capriciously,

for conflicts are

more easily avoided when one knows what to expect from the

other side.
The super powers also seek to regulate conflicts
between lesser states, whether they are members of a bloc,
or unaligned.

These conflicts are regulated in order that

they will not get so far out of hand as to endanger the
interests of one of the super powers, tempting it to inter
vene,

creating the spectacle of a super power confrontation

Regulation of these conflicts is through political and
economic means.

The super powers may come to an agreement

between themselves, seeking to impose it upon the states
involved,

or they may act as referees in bringing the

disputing parties together to reach a settlement.

Econ -

oxnic sanctions may be imposed by the super powers if the
lesser states refuse to halt their hostilities.

The use

of military power, however, would remain largely out of
the question,

for it could all too easily lead to that

which the super powers seek to avoid - a confrontation.
Coercion in a manually operated system may rely more
upon economic tools than upon any others, for this allows
the super powers to resort to a form of pressure that
deeply affects the offending states, while helping to avoid
the possibilities of a military confrontation.

Such a
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coercive device, however, calls for cooperation between
the super powers and other lesser states not involved in
the conflict,

if it is to be effective.

That the existence

of the system may appear to be at issue may well induce
such cooperation.
The super powers are also likely to resort to economic
means when attempting to coerce each other*

This may be

done by withholding from sale particular technological
items (such as computers) that the other side desperately
wishes to obtain,

or by refusing to develop certain re -

sources that the other side is known to need and want.

In

fact, economic development may well be a contributing
factor in the development of a manual system, for the super
powers may eventually find that they have reached a point
of economic development from which they may progress but
slowly without securing the trade and technical assistance
of the other.*5
In the manual system,

cooperation between the super

powers dictates that the use of propaganda, quite prevalent
in the automatic system, be curtailed, for it serves to
stress the differences between the camps and to maintain a
high degree of tension.

This may give the appearance of a
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convergence of ideological views.
illusion.16

This, however,

is an

There is an acceptance of the immediate need

for a coexistence of systems, but each side maintains a
belief that in the long run,
will prevail.

its own ideological system

This final victory, being inevitable, need

not be rushed toward, and violent means need not be used in
order to realize it.

Each side, having attempted an ideo -

logical storming of the other's position through the use
of propaganda,

in effect settles down for a long siege,

confident of final victory.
The development of a manual system has an effect upon
the relationship between the super powers and the lesser
states within the system.

In a loose bloc, there may be an

initial period of apprehension on the part of the lesser
states.

This is due to the fear that negotiations between

the super powers may result in an agreement affecting their
security.*7

This may cause these states to press for a re -

affirmation of their alliances with the leader,

and for an

assurance that they will be protected in the event of ag gression by the other super power.

Increased consultation,

especially before and after negotiations involving the super
powers, would be called for in order that the lesser states

might feel that they were given an opportunity to express
their views regarding the questions being discussed.
After the passing of the initial apprehension, the
lesser stateq in a loose bloc would be likely to realize
that they could play a far greater role in the operation of
the manual system than they had at first felt.

This role

would largely consist of either going along with agree ments between the super powers,

or playing the role of a

"spoiler,” thus making it difficult for the super powers to
put certain agreements into effect.

This realization

could well lead the lesser states to demand a partnership
with the super powers, perhaps not on equal terms, and
perhaps not as a negotiator at all high level meetings in volving the two, but at least as interested parties with a
veto power over particular sections of any agreements
reached.

Thus, the lesser states in a loose bloc could be

expected to gain a greater control over the operation of
the system in a manual system.
In a tight bloc, the lesser states would be less
likely to experience an initial period of fear at the
prospect of negotiations between the super powers,

for

these states already exist in a position in which their

security largely lies in the hands of their leader.

These

states would be much more likely to follow the negotiations
with the hope that perhaps they would result in a loosening
of the system, as would most likely occur.

The tight

system would be prone to loosen somewhat due to the
development of cooperation between the super powers,
largely because the leader would be engaged in a game of
such high stakes - that of securing cooperation with the
other super power,

that it would be reluctant to endanger

the negotiations by attempting to impose its will too
stringently upon its satellites, thereby raising the sus picions and perhaps even the moral indignation of the other
super power.

The leader in a tight bloc, however,

could

be expected to maintain a close watch over its satellites
in order to insure that they would not stray too far from
the accepted course of action,

issuing terse warnings to

those that appeared on the verge of doing so.
Unaligned states in a manual system would be likely to
find greater difficulty in playing the super powers against
each other than in the automatic system.

This would be due

to the increased cooperation between the super powers that
would result in agreements that would largely dictate a
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hands off policy with regard to these states, except in
the event that a war among them would dictate a need to
lead the way in reaching a settlement of the conflict.
This would mean that the super powers would be less likely
to compete with each other in giving aid to these states
in order to obtain their support, and that these states
would have to petition the super powers for such support.
These states would also be less able to act with impunity
towards one of the super powers, for the assistance of the
other super power that they would receive in the automatic
system would no longer be a certainty, and there would be
a chance that the super powers would reach an agreement
detrimental to the interests of the offending state in
such a circumstance.

Thus, the unaligned states would

find that in a manually operated system, they would have
less influence than in an automatic system, unless they
possessed some resource (such as oil) that made them im portant to the interests of the super powers.
In summary,

one may state that a bipolar system,

whether it is automatic or manual,
of states*

consists of two classes

the super powers and the lesser states.

These

states pursue policies that are designed to accumulate
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power in order that their security may be enhanced.

This

desire for security results in a competition among these
states which is dominated by the super powers and which has
a contagious nature.

In the automatic system, the super

powers compete with almost every means at their disposal to
dominate the system.

In a manual system, competition

between the big two remains, but it is regulated somewhat
in an effort to avoid a conflict that might plunge the en tire system into an abysmal war that could well spell the
destruction of all states within the system.
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CHAPTER III
A COMPARISON OF SYSTEMS
A.

THE AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS

In examining a balance of power system together with
a bipolar system, one is led to conclude that variations in
the operations of the two systems are traceable to the
different numbers of essential actors (states whose be havior affects all other members of the system) in each
system.

In a balance of power system this number is no

fewer than three, while in a bipolar system there are only
two essential actors.

The conclusion that it is the number

of states, rather than any other single factor, that causes
the systems to vary, may be arrived at by determining that
structurally, the systems are similar to one another in
every manner save one - number of dominating states.
Both a balance of power system and a bipolar system
consist of independent states, free of the controlling
direction of a superior body, holding control over their
own power and policy.

In both systems this lack of

direction from a central agency places the responsibility
for the maintenance of independence upon the individual
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states in the system.

In such a situation, these states

are prone to feel very insecure lest encroachments by
another state should deprive them of portions of their
territory, and perhaps even of their very identity.

In

order to insure that this will not happen, the states in
both systems seek to develop and increase their strength
in order that a display of such strength can deter possible
attacks from others.

This development of strength may be

a part of one of two processes, as a result of one's efforts
to add to one's own national power, or by concluding an
alliance with another state that will add the power of
that state to one's own.

In such a way, each state may

hope that it will, as a minimum goal, be able to prevent
the rise of any other state to a position of hegemony.
It is at this point, however, that one discovers a
difference between the two systems.

In a balance of power

system, all states are capable of forming meaningful al liances, that is, alliances that may add significantly to
their own strength, while in a bipolar system, one finds
that this is not the case.

The lesser states in a bipolar

system may conclude such an alliance, either among them selves in an effort to offset the strength of some other
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lesser state, or with one of the super powers in an attempt
to safeguard themselves from threats that the other super
power may pose.

The super powers, however, do not have

such an option, for there are no states with whom they can
ally that would add significantly to their power vis £i vis
the opposing super power.

For the super powers, alliances

with other states can at hest merely improve the striking
position of each with regard to the other super power, but
not its actual strength (I am assuming that the super
powers are economically self - sufficient).

An alliance

with a lesser state may also improve a super power's
ability to control a particular region, but again this does
not improve its actual military strength with regard to the
opposing super power, and hence may add little to its per ceived security.
This difference between the two systems with regard to
the ability of the dominating states (which shall be desig
nated in this discussion as great powers in a balance of
power system and as super powers in a bipolar system) to
conclude alliances to improve their actual power with re gard to one another is a direct result of the variance in
the number of actors in each system.

It has been determined

83

that a bipolar system may have two distinct classes of
states - the super powers, and the lesser states.

A balance

of power system may also have two such classes - the great
powers, and other, lesser states.

In the balance of power

system, however, one finds that the lesser states are, much
as in a bipolar system, free to conclude alliances among
themselves in an effort to counter other lesser states,
and at the same time to attach themselves to the appropriate
great power, or powers, in an effort to prevent their dom ination by another great power,

Yet, it is not only the

lesser states in a balance of power system that may do
this, but also the great powers that may conclude such
meaningful alliances to add significantly to their power,
not perhaps with the lesser states, but certainly with
other great powers.

Even when thenumber of great powers

is as low as three,

it is possible for two of the three to

form an alliance in

order to check the advances of the

third great power when it

threatens to dominate the system.*

With an increase in the number of great powers, the pos sible combinations and alliances also increase.

Such an

opportunity has great implications with regard to the op eration of the system, contributing to the differences

8^

that arise between the systems.
In considering the possible alliances in both a balance
of power system and a bipolar system, it may well clarify
later discussion if one attempts to attach a specific name
to the types of alliances found in each system.

Two types

of alliances shall be said to exist, positional and power
(these designations being chosen for no particular reason).
A positional alliance shall be defined as one in which a
state is able to improve its position with regard to a
possible attack upon an opponent, but where no substantial
power is added to the dominant state’s array of strength.
In such an alliance, the weaker of the states forming the
alliance, of course, does add a great deal to its own power
and prestige.

An example of such an alliance is the Soviet

alliance with Cuba, in which the Soviet Union was able to
gain a potential site for an attack upon the United States,
but gained no strength.
to its own prestige.

At the same time, Cuba added much

A power alliance, on the other hand,

is one in which all states involved add to their power as
a result of the alliance.

In such an alliance, it is also

possible that a state may obtain a more favorable position
with regard to a potential opponent.

One may quite rightly
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point out that other types of alliancesdo exist,

but they

shall not be dealt with here.
The concept of a positional alliance carries with it
the implication that one must know precisely who one’s op ponent or opponents are, or will be, before being able to
go about seeking such an alliance.

It is, of course, quite

convenient if the identity of the state or states against
whom one wishes to gain the advantage of position were to
remain stable over a long period of time.

Without such

stability, it could become inconceivable that one would
wish to engage in such alliances, since they would add
nothing to one's striking power and would indeed return
little, for a state has little use for a positional al liance unless it actually foresees the possibility of
needing to use the position gained for an actual strike.
This type of alliance, therefore, would

hardly be of use

to states engaging in a mere quarrel, but with no in tention of going to war.

Nor would a positional alliance

be particularly useful if a state or states felt it
necessary to forestall possible aggression on the part of
another state.

In such a situation, a power alliance would

be called for, as it would allow the states involved to
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demonstrate their collection of actual power.
A positional alliance is best suited to situations in
which there are two states more or less convinced that they
must live in opposition to one another for at least the
foreseeable future.

In such a case, the two states may be

warranted in seeking to gain a favorable position for a
possible attack upon the opponent, for one knows well that
any conflict will most likely be with this particular op ponent, and preparations for such a conflict might prudently
include an alliance that contains the advantage of position.
The conditions for the use of a positional alliance are
quite readily met by a bipolar system, for in it there are
two super powers poised against each other, knowing that
any war that is fought will be fought between them.
In a balance of power system these are not always
present.

A balance of power system may contain three or

more states, with each state holding no special animosity
toward any other specific state.

In such a situation, a

positional alliance would not be of particular use, except
in the event of an impending conflict, for the states in
the system would find that those they were gaining
positional advantage over in a dispute today could well be
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tomorrow's potential allies.

There is the possibility in

a balance of power system, however, that two particular
states may come to believe that they are irreconcilable
enemies (such a development could well lead to the mal functioning of the system should another state rise in
power and go unchecked due to such views), as did France
and Germany from the latter part of the nineteenth century
until the end of World War II,

When this occurs, then

positional alliances may well come to play a definite role
in the foreign policies of these states.

One may note that

Bismarck used such alliances against France in the nine teenth century, and that France sought a favorable position
as opposed to Germany when concluding the alliances that
formed the ’’Little Entente” after World War I.

In such a

situation, however, one may conclude that the two states
involved have resolved to play what may be seen as a double
game - at the same time engaging in the operation of a
balance of power system, while attempting to pursue favor able policies with regard to one another.

Thus, these two

states may be ready and willing to work with other states
(but not each other) in the balance of power system to
halt attempts at hegemony on the part of any state, while
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operating a bipolar system between themselves, competing
for position and power with one another.
There are certain problems associated with the in ability of the super powers in a bipolar world to conclude
power alliances that do not occur in a balance of power
system where there is a sufficient number of states to
allow such combinations.

One such problem is that the

policy makers of the super powers come to have little con fidence that a disturbed equilibrium will be able to right
itself, for there are no states with whom they may ally in
order to counter any increase in strength on the part of
the other super power,2

This causes the leaders of both

super powers anxiety lest they should fall behind their
opponent in some critical area of national power and leads
to a contagious competition between the super powers.
Such competition does not develop in a balance of power
system, except under extreme circumstances - such as when
the great powers divide themselves into two opposing
alliances, giving the system bipolar characteristics, as
occurred just prior to World War I.
Contagious competition fails to develop in a normally
functioning balance of power system primarily for two
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reasons:

the states in the system have the opportunity to

form power alliances in order to counter any state that may
threaten to.attain hegemony, and the larger number of
states, each pursuing its own particular formula in search
of additional power, makes it more difficult for any in dividual state to determine which states to watch carefully
and imitate to some extent.

In a balance of power system,

one may find states (such as Great Britain) that devote
large parts of their energies to maintaining a vast navy,
and others (such as France and Germany) that attempt to
maintain large armies.

Each state quite rightly pursues

that particular path to strength that best suits it, and it
is rare to find a state that is capable of devoting enough
resources to all such activities as to keep pace with all
others.

The sheer number of states with which to keep up

militates strongly against contagious competition, and even
should one state seek to engage in an attempt to keep up
(as did Germany prior to World War I, at least to some ex tent), if the other states in the system do not take a
reciprocal course, then contagious competition, as opposed
to regular competition (which may be defined as a situation
in which the states in the system compete with one another
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in the development of power, hut where this competition
does not necessarily involve imitation), does not develop*
The development of a contagious competition in a
bipolar system leads the super powers to view their rela tionship with one another in zero - sum terms, with a gain
for one side seen as an absolute loss for the other, and
vice versa*

In such a situation, both super powers become

very wary regarding the motives behind the actions of the
opponent.

Should one of the super powers develop an

interest in this or that state or region, no matter how far
it may be

removed from the center of the conflict between

the super

powers, then the other super power is more than

likely to

express an interest also, lest it may find it -

self at a

disadvantage due to some esoteric advantage that

may befall the opponent*

In such a situation, it becomes

very difficult, in fact nearly impossible, to deflect the
passions of conflicts between the super powers to the
periphery in some far off area, where the vital interests
of neither super power may be involved, for both super
powers come to believe that their vital interests are in volved in any area where either expresses an

interest.3

In a balance of power system, however, the larger
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number of great powers involved in the operation of the
system tends to provide for the opportunity to deflect
certain competition to the periphery, with conflicts
arising out of this competition remaining somewhat apart
from those a.rising in the system itself.

One may take the

nineteenth century European system as an example.

Certain

competitive passions were allowed by the states within the
system to vent themselves in a race for colonial territories
abroad.

This allowed each state within the system to expand

into areas where none of the other states felt they had any
particularly vital interests, areas such as Asia and
Africa.

Each state was able to expand on the periphery,

but in the closely watched areas of Europe, where all felt
they had vital interests at stake, there was no room for
such expansion.

It is true that at times two states might

come almost to blows over this colonial expansion, as did
Great Britain and France during the Fashoda crisis, but
these moments were easily overcome when problems within
the balance of power system itself demanded greater coop eration.

Thus, within ten years after the Fashoda crisis,

the situation in Europe demanded that the former potential
enemies, Great Britain and France, begin talks leading to
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an entente in order that they might jointly oppose German
power.
This may lead one to conclude that while the states in
a balance of power system tend towards a zero - sum view
of the system itself, there are areas outside the system in
which they may be prone to accept a nonconstant - sum view
of conditions.

While no state in the nineteenth century

European system was allowed to expand unopposed v/ithin the
system itself, for this would lead to an increase in power
thus disturbing the existing distribution of power, ex pansion outside of the system was possible, for it was
believed that it would not greatly affect the distribution
of power within the system.

Reinforcing this conclusion

is the fact that the great powers in the nineteenth century
actually cooperated with one another in nonconstant - sum
fashion to divide China up into spheres of influence in
order that the development of colonial possessions there
would be easier.

A bipolar system, on the other hand, due

to the contagious competition that exists between the
super powers, tends to foster a zero - sum view not only
of events and territory at the center of the contention
between the super powers, but also,with regard to any

areas, at any distance from the system, where either super
power indicates an interest.
Another factor associated with the contagious com petition inherent in a bipolar system, but not found in an
optimally set up balance of power system, is ideological
controversy.

Ideology as a tool used in the search for

power, whether used cynically in an effort to dupe those
in one’s own state and in other states into supporting
one’s actions, or genuinely advanced as a value system
that one believes in, plays a role in a bipolar world.

As

discussed earlier, the resort to the ideological tool tends
to be a result of the contagious competition between the
two super powers, in which the super powers both come to
advance the belief that they are "correct" in their
particular efforts to control and oppose the other ”in correct” super power.

The development of an ideology to

be adhered to by each super power is a part of a process
of explaining why each feels it is correct and outlining
the world that each would hope to create, should it have
the opportunity to do so.

This ideal world, one might call

it a Utopia, is then held out to the rest of the world as
a promise of a better future.

9^

In a balance of power system, two factors, the absence
of contagious competition, and the need to be free of any
constraints that could serve to block the shifting of al liances inherent in the system, militate against the
development of state ideologies.

Where such ideologies do

develop, they tend to disrupt the operation of the system.**'
Ideological fervor is not likely to develop as a result of
the functioning of a balance of power system due to the
number of states within the system, some of whom may be
allies at one point in time, and opponents at another.
One must, of course, realize that the people and leaders
of states, at almost all times, tend to believe themselves
to be pursuing the right course.

This is true in both a

balance of power system and in a bipolar system.

In a

balance of power system this belief does not, however,
necessarily develop into an ideological crusade simply be cause such a crusade needs an opponent, and in a balance of
power system no particular opponent is always readily
available (except if a state - such as Revolutionary
France - wishes to take on the rest of the system).

It is

difficult to imagine France indulging in a truly ideo logical vendetta against Great Britain in I8 9 8 over Fashoda,
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knowing that the rising power of Germany could force the
two states into an alliance within a short period of time.
In a balance of power system no particular state can
actually afford to attack any other particular state in a
continually passionate manner that an ideological struggle
tends to call for, because it realizes that at some point
in the future it may need the assistance of that very state
to forestall the ambitions of another rival, and the
emotions of such an assault make the attainment of such
help all the more difficult.

In fact, one is only able to

discover an example of emotional and ideological passion
in the unreal balance of power system depicted in George
Orwell’s 1984. where the state’s total control over the
populace allowed it to cause them to forget that today’s
ally was just yesterday depicted in the foulest of terms,
In the real world of balance of power politics reliance is
placed more upon the concrete realities of power politics
than upon the abstractions of ideology that one finds in a
bipolar system.

In fact, one need only examine the op -

eration of the European system in the 1930*s to see pre cisely how ideological differences may be relegated to the
periphery as one is able to review the manner in which the
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Soviet Union came to conclude an alliance with a state Germany - whose ideological allegiances were exactly
counter to those in the U.S.S.R.
Contagious competition between the super powers in a
bipolar system has effects upon the alliances formed in
that system, causing them to develop a rigidity that
transforms them from alliances - from which all parties
may escape - into blocs, from which escape is difficult, if
at all possible.

In a bipolar system each super power

seeks to obtain alliances with lesser states, particularly
those lesser states located in key regions, or in positions
from which it would be easier to strike at the other super
power.

In obtaining these alliances, the super powers are

guided by a zero - sum perception of the system, hoping
that each new state that falls into line will help them
obtain an advantage over the opponent.

Once these lesser

states have entered into an alliance with one of the super
powers, each super power seeks to hold them in place in
the alliance out of the fear that to lose any particular
ally from its orbit would be virtually the same as a gain
for the opposing super power, even if it did not join the
other bloc.
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For their part, the lesser states in a bipolar world
find that the only manner in which they may gain a reason able degree of security is to ally themselves with the
super power that is perceived as being the less threatening,
or the more friendly.

Once they

have entered into an

agreement, explicit or implicit,

with a super power, these

states develop a fear of leaving

the security of such a

relationship, particularly since

thismay expose them to

the revenge of the other super power.

There develops out

of this situation a tendency in a bipolar system for al liances to become permanent entities from which the lesser
states are afraid to attempt to escape, and which the
super powers fear to dissolve due to a desire not to lose
position with regard to the opponent.

These alliances

develop into blocs with all members more or less permanently
fixed under the supervision of the respective super power.
In a balance of power system, however, such is not
the case.

Here one finds the great powers continually

maneuvering among themselves for position, with each having
as its minimum goal that the system should not be dominated
by any particular state - unless that state happens to be
itself.

In such a situation, the great powers are unable
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to conclude permanent alliances, for there is the possibil ity that any of those with whom one may ally at one point
in time to block the rise of a particular state, may at
another time threaten to dominate the system itself.

One

finds that in the operation of the system in Europe in the
twenty years after World War I that certain states, Great
Britain among them, came to experience a certain uneasiness
that France was on the verge of dominating the system in
the 1920*s.

In this situation, the British felt compelled

to refuse to support the French on particular occasions in
an effort to prevent hegemony (although no alliance was ever
concluded).

Yet, within fifteen years, the British found

themselves allied with the French, as each state sought to
counter the rise of Nazi Germany.

Such shifts In a balance

of power system are common and tend to make alliances and
understandings among the great powers fail to take on the
characteristics and permanence needed for a bloc to develop.
Lesser states in a balance of power system also are
not likely to be sucked into blocs formed by the great
powers.

This is because alliances in a balance of power

system are generally concluded in the desire to obtain
greater power, and an alliance with a lesser state would

not fit this purpose.

Great powers are not likely to seek

alliances with lesser states merely in an effort to obtain
sway over these states unless these states are located in
key positions.

In such a case, however, the interests of

several great powers would be concerned, and these particu lar lesser states would most likely be placed in a position
of neutrality, under the dominance of no great power, as
were the low countries in Western Europe in the European
balance of power system before both the first and second
World Wars.

A great power may seek to create a cordon

sanitaire out of lesser states about it, as Russian rulers
have tried to do in Eastern Europe for years, but even this
does not reflect the characteristics of a bloc, for it is
created for specific defensive purposes and does not seek
to include states far from the interested great power's
borders.
Despite the fact that a balance of power system
operates best when the states within it are able to main tain a degree of mobility with regard to the formation of
alliances, there are occasions upon which the system breaks
up into two rather inflexible groups of states in opposing
alliances.

As Duverger points out, when writing of similar
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tendencies in political parties, such instances are usually
the result of the development of a crisis.5

Such a dif -

ficulty in a balance of power system could well arise out
of attempts on the part of one of its members to dominate
the system.

In making such a move, the state with ex -

pansionist motives would be likely to seek the support of
other states in its quest, forming an alliance with these
states.

In so doing, the alarm may be sounded for the rest

of the system by the balancer (or balancers) who perceives
the danger and hopes to avoid the domination of the system
by setting up a league of defense.

In such a crisis, all

members of the system are faced with choosing between one
of the two sides, creating, for a time, a pseudo - bipolar
system.

The system does not retain these bipolar features

for long, however, for the issue most likely is resolved
either as a result of defections from alliances, forcing
one side to back down, or as a result of war.
A balance of power system may also develop bipolar
characteristics as a result of a clash between two states
within the system, each of which regards the other as a
permanent foe (as did Germany and France in the European
system from 1870 to the end of World War II).

In this
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case, it is likely that the system may have had latent
bipolar tendencies prior to the eruption as each of the
two primary contestants most probably will have sought to
accumulate the support of potential allies in the event of
a conflict.

The division of Europe into two armed camps

on the eve of World War I followed this course, as both
Germany and France sought to enlist the other states in
the European system in tacit alliances that gave the system
unseen bipolar characteristics.

When a conflict arose, the

two alliance structures emerged to confront one another,
and war resulted.

In the optimal operation of a balance

of power system, however, such latent bipolarity is avoided,
for flexibility is the fabric out of which the system is
made.
It should be pointed out that while a balance of power
system may tend toward bipolarity in a time of crisis, as
these occasions pass, the system reverts to multipolarity,
and flexibility reappears.

Such was the case at the end of

the Napoleonic Wars, when the European system again
functioned without two alliance systems in opposition to
one another.

After World War I one also sees this pattern,

with some flexibility appearing in the system until the
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eve of World War II, when the crisis of Hitler’s demands
again brought about a break - up of the system into two
armed camps.
In the contagious competition found in a bipolar
system, one is able to detect a tendency to move toward
extremes not found in a balance of power system.^

This is

due to the absence of any state that has the stature to
act as a mediator between the two hostile super powers, to
the ease with which each super power is able to calculate
the power which may be arrayed against it on any particular
occasion, and to the need of each super power to match and
surpass, if possible, the strength of its opponent in an
effort to insure its security.

Examining the last reason

first, one finds that in the pursuit of power each super
power may be prone to resort to almost any tactics that
may be helpful in attaining this end.

Such tactics may in -

elude the fanning of a people’s emotions through the resort
to either ideological or nationalistic appeals.

Ideology

is used to portray one's own cause as just and as promising
a better future to the rest of the world, while
nationalistic appeals are used in seeking to guarantee to
particular groups in the bipolar system that their identity
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is important to the sponsoring super power.

In using these

appeals, both super powers play, whether cynically or out
of a genuine concern, upon the emotions of those concerned
in a manner not usually found in a balance of power system
(although one may find such emotionalism in a balance of
power system wrought by conflict into two opposing camps witness World War I in which the allies sought to portray
•the German troops as Huns invading from the east).

Such

emotionalism tends to be limited in the operation of a
balance of power system, as has been stated earlier, due to
the need by all states concerned to be free to realign
themselves whenever a crisis develops In which one state
threatens hegemony.

The emotionalism engendered by ideology

and excessive nationalism militates against this.
The super powers not only make use of emotionalism in
their search for power, but they grasp at any weapon or
weapons system that may come into being, conducting a tire less search for ever new methods of conducting wars against
one another.

One may point out that the great powers are

also likely to engage in such a search, but theirs is at
least partially tempered by the realization that an al liance with other states is an option in the event that one

state may leap ahead of all the others, while in a bipolar
system such an option does not exist, forcing the super
powers to one extreme after another in their search for
ever greater power in order to guarantee their security.
Thus, the search for military power in a contest between
the super powers may quickly become divorced from security
considerations, with power being accumulated for the sake
of having power.

In a balance of power system, on the

other hand, a great power is more likely to tie power to
security concerns, for here the possibility of defensive
alliances helps create a sensation of security through
numbers.
The ease with which a super power may calculate the
array of strength of its opponent on any particular oc casion and at any point in the system serves to force the
super powers to extremes.

On the one hand, the knowledge

of almost exactly how much strength the sole opponent
possesses tends to create in each super power the desire
to hedge somewhat by having just a bit more in any particu
lar area.

Such hedging by both sides soon pushes the race

for strength to extremes.

In a balance of power system,

where there is no certain knowledge at any point in time
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prior to a conflict as to the precise identity of one's
opponents, such hedging is not very possible, for no great
power is able to determine the amount of strength that must
be accumulated to overcome a potential rival, or group of
rivals.

Given that the great powers are of approximately

equal strength, it is not possible for any one of them to
seek to match the strength of all possible rivals - to do
so would mean attempting to be as strong as the whole of
the system combined, which is out of the reach of any of
the great powers, or else it would dominate the system, and
there would be no balance of power system.
The knowledge of very nearly exactly how much strength
the opposing super power possesses at any given point in the
system, on the other hand, may tempt a super power to
resort to the extreme of war by attacking at a weak point,
either directly, using its own forces, or indirectly,
using the forces of a satellite.

An example of such action

is the Korean offensive in 1950 in which a Soviet satellite
appeared to probe at a weak point in the American defensive
armor in an effort to achieve a fait accompli by occupying
South Korea before the United States could react to sup port the South Korean forces.

Such an extreme move can
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only be resorted to with relative safety when one is fairly
sure of the weakness that one’s opponent possesses in a
particular area.

In a balance of power system, such a

calculation is not easily made, for no great power that
wishes to move against what appears to be a weak link in
another great power's armor can be assured that in so doing
it will not call into effect some secret protocol that
would array against it an impressive force.
Negotiation and compromise are needed if one is to
avoid a resort to extremes.

In a bipolar world, the op -

portunities for negotiations leading to compromises between
the super powers are poorer than are those in a balance of
power system.

This is due to the absence of any state

with the stature to act as a mediator, to the ideological
differences between the super powers, and to the zero - sum
view that the super powers have not only of areas central
to the conflict between them, but of peripheral areas as
well.

The absence of a third state to act as a broker in

negotiations between the two super powers makes it difficult
for the super powers to negotiate at all, for there is no
one to help get them to a conference table together.

Even

should the super powers make the attempt to bargain between

themselves, it is quite difficult to reach an agreement
without an interested third party to help iron over dif ferences, to propose compromises on sticky issues, and to
add the weight of its own power to any agreements that may
be reached.

In a balance of power system, however, one

finds that the larger number of states tends to allow one
or another of the states in the system to act as a mediator
in disputes.

One may examine the role that Great Britain

played so effectively in the nineteenth century system to
see how helpful her role was in resolving disputes within
the system, most notably between France and Germany.

The

fact that Great Britain had sufficient power to play the
role of an operator in the system helped to prevent any
state from resorting to extremes over any particular issue
and aided in the search for compromises short of war.
The ideological differences between the super powers
serve to stave off the possibility of compromise between
them due to the belief on the part of each that the other
represents "incorrect” views and therefore is not to be
bargained with.

In such a situation each comes to believe

that even the slightest concession to the other is un *thinkable.

Without concessions on small issues, the
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possibility of an agreement encompassing more important
differences is lost.

The lack of such ideological dif -

ferences in an optimally set up balance of power system,
on the other hand, makes it far easier to negotiate, for
each state concerns itself more with the concrete issues
of power politics than with the lofty and abstract con siderations of ideology.
The zero - sum view that the super powers share re garding not only the central portions of a bipolar system,
but peripheral areas as well also makes it difficult to
compromise.

Such a view makes it virtually impossible to

satisfy a super power’s appetite by allowing it to digest
certain peripheral areas, thus appeasing it and keeping it
from pressing claims

closer to home.

This arrangement is

not possible because

itis not possible to uncover any

area, peripheral or otherwise, that either super power would
be likely to declare

it was willing to allow the other to

take, for all points

on the globe become of vital concern

to a super power as soon as the other super power declares
an interest.

In a balance of power system, however, one

finds the opportunity to achieve compromises by deflecting
passions to the periphery, as was discussed earlier.
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B.

THE MANUAL SYSTEMS

The primary difference between a manual balance of
power system and a manual bipolar system is that in the
former the policy makers of the essential actors develop
an understanding of the theoretical framework upon which
the system is built and attempt to institutionalize the
system itself, while in the latter the statesmen directing
the super powers do not so much wish to institutionalize the
system as they desire to avoid a conflict that could result
in a catastrophic war.

This difference may again be at -

tributed to the variance in the number of essential actors
found in each system.

In a balance of power system, with

its larger number of essential actors, a state may feel
reasonably secure if it is assured that no one state will
be allowed to rise to a position of hegemony.

If no state

is allowed to gain a significantly larger share of strength
than is possessed by any other state within the system,
then it is felt that it will be deterred from committing
aggression and threatening the security of others by the
belief that its strength employed in such an effort will
be opposed by equal or greater power, making the prospect
of success small.
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The problem for the system consists in assuring that
an aggressor will be met by a force of equal or greater
strength, and that should a war result that it will not be
pursued with such vigor and bitterness as to bring about
the destruction of any of the states within the system.
It is this problem that the statesmen in a manually operated
system seek to solve, for in its solution lies increased
security for all states with the assurance that no one
state will be allowed to dominate, and that no war will be
allowed to destroy any state in the system.

The answer to

the problem is seen in rendering the behavior of the states
in the system as predictable as possible, especially in
crisis situations.?

In seeking to do this, the policy

makers develop a set of rules (see Chapter I) for the
functioning of the system that is at least implicitly
agreed to by all.

With such rules, and the realization of

the necessity for abiding by them, the system may function
in a smooth manner, allowing each state within the system
to experience a greater sense of security.
While a manual balance of power system operates in
order that security may be enhanced by creating machinery
to correct quickly imbalances in the system, a bipolar
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system may not be operated in such a manner, for there
exists no method of correcting imbalances, due to the fact
that there are only two essential actors in the system.

A

manual bipolar system evolves from an automatic bipolar
system as a part of an almost natural process (given, of
course, that the automatic system does not break down into
an all out war that destroys both super powers).

In an

automatic bipolar system one finds two super powers poised
against each other, each wishing to destroy the other, but
at the same time fearing that any attempt to do so would
result in its own destruction.

In such a situation it

would seem quite natural that both would attempt at first
to gather about it all the manifestations of power that it
could in the hope that it might gain a decisive advantage,
thereby allowing it to do away with the opponent and remain
alone to dominate.

Accompanying these efforts to gain the

upper hand there is a severe fear lest the opposing super
power develop a means by which it would land on top.

This

fear creates a contagious competition between the super
powers that serves to heighten their distrust of one an other, and drives them to extremes in behavior.
It is in the midst, and as a result, of this
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competition that sober minds realize the necessity of easing
the tensions between the super powers before a disastrous
war develops.

It is this attempt to ease tensions that

results in the creation of a manual bipolar system.

There

is no particular machinery set up for the purpose of deal ing with imbalances, rather the super powers continue to
resort to contagious competition, but with a leash placed
upon propaganda that might serve to maintain tensions.
The main purpose of the manual operation of a bipolar system
consists in avoiding conflicts between the super powers
and clashes between lesser states that might draw in the
super powers.

Thus, one finds that the major difference

between the operation of a manual balance of power system
and a manual bipolar system is that in the balance of power
system attempts are made to insure that the equilibrating
process will function properly, while in the bipolar system
attempts are made to guarantee that no resort need be made
to any type of equilibrating process, for none exists that
will function with certainty.
There are, however, certain similarities in the op eration of both systems.

An effort is made in each system

to temper the behavior of the essential actors.

In a
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balance of power system this is done by creating machinery
that will, with certainty, meet any attempt at hegemony
with whatever force is necessary to prevent success.

A

bipolar system modifies behavior to the extent that the
super powers reduce their use of propaganda and other de vices that serve to increase tensions.

Consensus regarding

the rules by which the manual system is governed and com munication between states in order that these rules might
be observed and enforced are essential, to the operation of
both systems.

This consensus may be explicitly agreed to,

or it may be tacit, resulting from a thorough understanding
of international political theory, and from studying the
policies and responses of each actor.

In a balance of

power system, consensus and communication are necessary in
the development of leagues of defense, for all states must
share in the desire to create alliances when necessary and
must be able to communicate well in order that they might
be formed.

A bipolar system requires consensus between

the super powers regarding the necessity of avoiding con flicts whenever and wherever possible, and communication
in order that each might know the other’s intentions
whenever a crisis erupts.

Unilateral action without prior
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consultation with other essential actors is avoided, for it
would give the impression of capriciousness, endangering
both the predictability needed in a balance of power system,
and the delicate equilibrium between the super powers that
the bipolar system seeks to maintain.
In conclusion, it may be stated that both a balance of
power system and a bipolar system are constructed of in dependent states that must maintain their own security.
The manner in which these states attempt to do this is
influenced by the number of essential actors found in the
system.

In a balance of power system, with three or more

essential actors, states may not only develop their in dividual strengths, but they may also form power alliances
to aid in the search for greater security.

A bipolar

system, however, with only two super powers, does not allow
for the use of power alliances, helping to create the con ditions from which contagious competition arises.
This contagious competition helps to push the super
powers to extremes not found in the competition among the
great powers in a balance of power system.

The contest

between the super powers tends toward abstractions, while
the struggle among the great powers concerns itself more
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with hard political realities.

Ideological differences

between the super powers develop an importance not found
in any such differences among the great powers.

Alliances

in a balance of power system are far more flexible than
are those in a bipolar system where alliances tend to be come blocs.
The operation of a balance of power system may be a
product of one of three types of policy:
semi - automatic, or manual.
are two types of policy:

automatic,

In a bipolar system, there

automatic and manual.

In each

system, an automatic policy involves a zero - sum view of
the system, with the states in the system attempting to
pursue strategies aimed at propelling them into positions
of hegemony.

The adoption of manual policies involves the

acceptance of a nonconstant - sum perception of the system
and the abandonment of attempts at dominating the system.
A manually operated balance of power system involves an
attempt to institutionalize the system and render the be havior of the states within it predictable.

A manual

bipolar system is based upon the need to avoid confronta tions between the super powers that might produce a dis astrous war.

Both of these manual systems demand a high

degree of consensus concerning the rules governing the op
eration of the system.

In a manual system, communication

and consultation among the essential actors are vitally
important if conflicts are to he avoided and security en hanced.

117

NOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE

ICarl Friedrich, Foreign Policy in the Making, The
Search for a New Balance of Power (New York: W . W. Norton
and Co., *9 3 8 ), p. 1 2 0 .
^Henry Kissinger, "Central Issues of American Foreign
Policy," American Foreign Policy: Three Essays (New Yorks
W. W. Norton and Co. , 1969), P . 56*
3Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New Yorks
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 19 6 3 )» P* 361.
^Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Transformation of
Alliance Systems," The American Political Science Review.
Vol. LIX, no. 3 (September, 19 6 5 )» pp. 5 8 9 “ 6 01.
5Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New Yorks
John Wiley and Sons, Inc,*i 19^3)~ p. 2 1 6 .
6 Morgenthau, op.

Yorks

cit., p.

3 ^9 .

?Inis Claude, Power and International Relations (New
Random House, I9 6 2 ), pT 127.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Public Documents
Crowe, Eyre.
"Foreign Office Memorandum on
State of British Relations with France
January 1, 1907," British Documents on
the War. 1898 - 191^
Vol. Ill, pp.

the Present
and Germany,
the Origins of
502~^"¥0 3 ^

Books
Aron, Raymond.
"The Anarchial Order of Power," Conditions
of V/or Id Order. ed.
Stanley Hoffman. Boston:
Houghton - Mifflin Co., 1 9 6 8 , pp. 25 - 48,
Beloff, Max. The' Balance of Power.
University Press, 19^7^
"

Montreal:

McGill

Butterfield, Herbert.
"The BaJance of Power," Diplomatic
Investigat ions. ed.
Herbert Butterfield and Martin
Wight. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 9 6 8 ,
pp~ 1 3 2 - 148.
Claude, Inis. Power and Internalional Relations.
Random House, 1 9 6 2 ,

New York:

Clausewitz, Carl von. "What is War?" World Politics. ed.
Arend Lijphart. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971.
Cobben, Alfred. The Nation State and National Self Determination. New York: Thomas Y, Crowell Co., 1 9 6 9 .
Dougherty, James E. and Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr.
Contending Theories of International Relations.
York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1971.

New

Dulles, John Foster. "To Save Humanity From the Deep
Abyss,” American Foreign Policy Since 1945. ed.
Robert Divine. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1 9 6 9 ,
pp. 6 9 - 7 6 .

118

Duverger, Maurice.
Political Parties.
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1 9 ^ 3 •

New York:

John

Friedrich, Carl.Foreign Policy in
the Making, The Search
for a New Balanceof Power. New York:
W. W. Norton
and Co., 193$.
Fulbright, J. William. "Beyond Coexistence,” Beyond
Coexistence:
TheRequirements of Peace. ed.
Edward
Reed. New York: Grossman Publishers, 19&8,
pp. 1 2 7 - 1 3 1 .
Garaudy, Roger. "The Threats to Coexistence," Beyond
Coexistence:
TheRequirements of Peace. ed.
Edward
Reed. New York: Grossman Publishers, 1968,
pp. 28 - 3 0 .
Hume, David.
"Of the Balance of Power,” Essays and Treatises
on Several Subjects. London: T. Cadell, 1772,
pp. 3^7 - 3 5 6 .
Jay, John,. "Relations With Foreign Powers," The Federalist,
ed. Paul Ford. New York: Henry Holt and Co., I8 9 8 ,
pp. 18 - 2 1 .
Khrushchev, Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers.
Bantam Books, Inc., 1971*

New York:

Kissinger, Henry. "Central Issues of American Foreign
Policy," American Foreign Policy: Three Essays. New
York: W. W , Norton and Co. , 1969, pp. 53 -109.
La Feber, Walter.
19^5 - 1 9 6 6 ,
1967.

America. Russia, and the Cold War.
New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,

Madison, James. "The Size and Variety of the Union as a
Check on Faction," The Federalist. ed. Paul Ford.
New York: Henry Holt and Co., I8 9 8 , pp.
- 63.
Millis, Walter.
"How to Compete With the Russians,"
American Foreign Policy Since 19**5. ed. Robert Divine.
Chicago: Quadrangle Books] 19^9, pp. 121 - 128,

119

Morgenth-au, Hans. A New Foreign Policy for the United
States. New York: Praeger Publishers, 19&9*
Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations.
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 19^3.

New York:

Morgenthau, Hans. Truth and Power.
Publishers, 1970.

New York:

Praeger

Organski, A. F. K. World Politics,
Knopf, Inc., 1 9 6 8 ,

New York:

Alfred A.

Quintanilla, Luis* "Comments on the Threat to Coexistence,"
Beyond Coexistence: The Requirements of Peace. ed.
Edward Reed. New York: Grossman Publishers, 1968,
pp. 3 8 - ^ 1 .
Rostow, W. W. "The Test: Are We the Tougher?" American
Foreign Policy Since 19^5. ed, Robert Divine.
Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969. PP» 17^ “ 182.
Schleicher, Charles P. International Relations:
Cooperation and Conflict. Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice - Hall, Inc., 1962.
Shubik, Martin. "The Uses of Game Theory," Contemporary
Political Analysis. ed. James C. Charlesworth. New
York: The Free Press, 196?, pp. 239 - 272,
Thompson, Kenneth. The Moral Issue in Statecraft, Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966,
Tocqueville, Alexis de. "Democracy and Foreign Policy,"
World Politics.
ed. Arend Lijphart. Boston:
Allyn
and Bacon, Inc., 1971. pp. 10& - 107.
Toynbee, Arnold. A Study of History.
Oxford University Press, 193^.

Vol.

Van Dyke, Vernon.
International Relations.
Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1 ^ 6 6 ,

120

III.

London:

New York:

Wight, Martin.
"The Balance of Power," Diplomatic
Investigations. ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin
Wight. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968,
pp. 1^9 - 175.
Articles and Periodicals
Brzezinski, Zbigniew.
"The Diplomatic Implications of
Change for United States Foreign Policy," The
Department of State Bulletin. Vol. LVII, no.
1^62,
pp. 19 - 23.
Dinerstein, Herbert S. "The Transformation of Alliance
Systems," The American Political Science Review.
Vol. LIX, no. 3 (September, 1 9 6 5 ). pp. 589 ~ 601.
Haas, Ernst B. "The Balance of Power: Prescription,
Concept or Propaganda?" World Politics. Vol. 5.
no. k (July, 1953), pp. ^59 - ^7^.
Kaplan, Morton.
"Balance of Power, Bipolarity, and Other
Models of International Systems," The American
Political Science Review. Vol. LI, no. 3 ^September,
1957), PP, 68^ - 695.

121

VITA

John Martin Rothgeb, Jr.
Born in Arlington, Virginia, November 21, 19^9.
Graduated from Yorktown Senior High School in that county,
June 1 9 6 8 , B.A., College of William and Mary, 1972.
candidate, College of William and Mary, 1975*

M.A.

The course

requirements for this degree have been completed.
In September 197**, the author entered the State
University of New York at Binghamton as a graduate assistant
in the Department of Political Science.

122

